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Abstract 
The Swedish processor Findus contracts approximately 500 pea producers annually to secure 
the company’s supply of green peas for human consumption. A production contract, which 
has had roughly the same design for decades, regulates the relation between Findus and the 
pea producers. Agriculture is typically a risky business. The main sources of risk in 
agricultural production are production risk and price risk. It can be questioned whether the 
current pricing model in the Findus pea production contract is optimal as the conditions facing 
a grain farmer have changed due to increased price risk in agricultural commodity markets.  
 
The aim of this study is to examine, from the producer’s viewpoint, the current production 
contract between Findus and its pea producers and whether there are alternative pea pricing 
models that are more effective for both contract parties given volatile agricultural commodity 
markets. A quantitative approach is used. The method consists of a telephone survey with a 
number of Findus pea producers and a mathematical programing model based on mean-
variance (EV) analysis (Hardaker et. al., 1997) with historical data from a case farm.  
 
The main findings are that the Findus pea production contract functions well in terms of 
motivation; the pea producers have incentives to maximize the integrated profit (Bogetoft & 
Ballebye Olesen, 2004). This is also verified by the results of optimization model and the 
survey. The differences between the examined pricing models are very small both in terms of 
expected net farm income, expected utility and risk. The value of incorporating Findus peas in 
the crop rotation is considered to be high. In the south western part of Skåne, Findus peas is 
the second most profitable crop in the crop rotation in terms of gross margin 3 (GM3). This 
can be explained by substantially lower costs compared to alternative crops, especially in 
terms of machinery costs.      
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Sammanfattning  
Den svenska företaget Findus AB kontrakterar årligen cirka 500 ärtodlare för att säkra 
bolagets behov av gröna ärter avsedda för humankonsumtion. Förhållandet mellan Findus och 
ärtproducenterna regleras av ett produktionskontrakt, som i stort sätt har haft samma 
utformning i årtionden. Lantbruk är en riskfylld bransch där de huvudsakliga riskkällorna är 
produktions- och prisrisk. Det kan ifrågasättas om prissättningsmodellen i det nuvarande 
kontraktet är optimal då villkoren för spannmålsodlare har förändrats eftersom 
prisvolatiliteten på spannmålsmarknaden ökat under senare år. 
 
Syftet med denna studie är att utifrån producenternas synvinkel undersöka det nuvarande 
produktionskontraktet mellan Findus och deras ärtproducenter och om det finns alternativa 
prissättningsmodeller som är mer ändamålsenliga för båda kontraktsparter med avseende på 
den ökade prisvolatiliteten på spannmålsmarknaden. Kvantitativa metoder har använts och 
består av en telefonundersökning med ett antal av Findus ärtproducenter och en matematisk 
programmeringsmodell baserad på kvadratisk optimering (Hardaker et. al., 1997). I modellen 
har historiska data från en fallgård använts. 
 
De huvudsakliga slutsatserna är att Findus produktionskontrakt fungerar väl när det gäller 
motivation, ärtproducenterna har incitament för att maximera den integrerade vinsten 
(Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Detta verifieras också av resultaten av 
optimeringsmodellen och enkätundersökningen. Skillnaderna mellan de undersökta 
prissättningsmodellerna är mycket små i termer av både förväntad nettoinkomst, förväntad 
nytta och risk. Värdet av att innefatta ärter odlade för Findus i växtföljden är hög. I sydvästra 
Skåne är Findus ärter den näst mest lönsamma grödan i växtföljden i form av täckningsbidrag 
3 (TB3). Detta kan framförallt förklaras av väsentligt lägre maskinkostnader jämfört med 
alternativa grödor. 
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1 Introduction 
Production of agricultural commodities under contract is increasingly becoming more 
common and accounts for about 40% of the U.S. agricultural production (Hoppe & Banker, 
2010). Typically, farmers use two different types of contracts: production and marketing 
contracts. The phenomenon is referred to as contract farming and can be defined as an 
agreement between one or more producer(s) and a contractor for the production of agricultural 
commodities under forward agreements, typically at predetermined prices (Bijman, 2008). 
Commonly, production and marketing contracts specify the type, quality, and quantity of the 
agricultural product for delivery at a future point in time. In contrary to a marketing contract, 
a production contract gives the contractor, typically a processor, significant control over a 
production process and input usage (Meuwissen et. al., 2001). In production contracts, the 
farmer is committed to follow particular production methods and input regimes. Production 
contracts account for the majority of the U.S poultry, egg and hog production (MacDonald et. 
al., 2004). Also, about 7% of the U.S. vegetable production is produced under production 
contracts.   
 
Findus is a Swedish processor that by the use of production contracts has secured its supply of 
agricultural products for several decades. The company is a large Swedish processor of 
vegetables and one of the company’s most important products are frozen green peas for 
human consumption (pers. comn., Persson & Påhlsson, 2012). Approximately 500 pea 
producers in Skåne and the south part of Halland are contracted annually and during the 
growing season of 2011, green peas were grown on 8000 hectares (pers. comn., Persson, 
2012). The pea production contract, regulating the relationship between Findus and the 
farmers, has roughly been formulated in the same way since the start of Findus’ green pea 
production. Green peas for human consumption is in Sweden only produced under production 
contracts. Thus, there is no spot market for green peas.  
 
1.1 The Findus Pea Production Contract  
In production of green peas for human consumption accurate planning is needed as the 
harvesting time of peas is essential for the outcome (pers. comn., Persson & Påhlsson, 2012). 
Ripe peas need to be harvested within 24 hours and frozen within 3 hours from harvesting. To 
maximize the length of the harvesting period and thus optimize the capacity of Findus’ 
machinery and factory, Findus has about eight different pea varieties that are grown each 
year. Early varieties are fast growing and low yielding whilst late varieties are less fast 
growing but high yielding (pers. comn., Nilsson, J, 2012). Early varieties are planted on light, 
coastal and warm soils. As different varieties are suitable for different planting times and soil 
characteristics, the same variety is in general planted in the same geographical region year 
after year. The planting period starts in late March and ends in early June and the harvesting 
period stretches between late June and late August.  
 
The pea production year is illustrated in Figure 1 and starts in January when the pea price is 
negotiated between the pea producers, represented by the Pea Grower Association, and Findus 
(pers. comn., Persson & Påhlsson, 2012). The Findus’ pea contract can be compared to a 
forward contract as the price is determined when the contract is entered (Tomek & Peterson, 
2001). If the farmer chooses to grow peas, Findus delivers seed without charge and decides on 
what variety that each farmer shall plant. Findus consultants give agronomic advice 
concerning planting time, fertilizer recommendations and pest management, which must be 
respected by the pea producers. The pea producers provide the land and perform soil 
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preparation, planting and plant protection. Findus decides on harvesting time and arranges for 
this without charge.   
 
Figure 1. Schematic picture of the Findus pea production. Source: own modification. 
 
The payment that the grower obtains is based on the tenderometer value (t-value) of the peas 
delivered to the processing plant in Bjuv (Findus Sverige AB, 2011). The t-value is a measure 
of the maturity and quality of raw peas. In order to obtain high quality of frozen green peas, 
the peas are normally harvested at a t-value of 100-110. The payment follows a price scheme 
for different varieties and t-values and a base price is calculated for a t-value of 100. In 
relation to the base price, the price increases for t-values below 100 and decreases for t-values 
above 100. This is due to that yield is positively correlated with the t-value. Thus, a lower 
yield is compensated with a higher price per kg. As the produced quality is unknown when 
the contract is entered, the exact price received is partly unknown until the peas are delivered 
to the plant. The price paid per kg of different varieties also varies as the average yield differs 
between varieties. Consequently, high yielding varieties receive a lower price per kg 
compared to low yielding varieties. The intention of the above described price scheme is that 
an individual farmer should be indifferent regardless of what variety that is grown. Hence, the 
pricing scheme for various varieties and t-values is adjusted for the yield potential of each 
variety based on field experiments. Fields that are harvested late receive an additional 
payment as the growth of the peas decreases when the days become shorter and colder. 
Accordingly, farmers that plant late and therefore harvest late are economically compensated. 
 
If a field cannot be combined due to weather conditions, the producer is entitled to economic 
compensation (Findus Sverige AB, 2011). Moreover, the grower is guaranteed a minimum 
payment of 58% of the average payment of the year. However, the minimum payment cannot 
exceed 5100 SEK per hectare. Except for these limitations, Findus’ total minimum payment 
paid to all producers, is restricted to 1 500 000 SEK. The producer does not receive any 
minimum payment if it is proven that the yield reduction is a result of the producer’s 
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negligence. Payment to the producer is due no more than 30 days after harvest, but no sooner 
than October 5th.  
 
1.2 Problem  
“Agricultural production is typically a risky business” (Hardaker et. al., 1997, p. ix). 
Agricultural production is associated with primarily two sources of risk: price risk due to 
fluctuating prices and production risk due to weather conditions etc. (Chavas et. al., 2010). 
Historically, agricultural markets around the world have been regulated in order to help 
farmers cope with risk (Hardaker et. al., 1997). In the last decades, governments have altered 
their agricultural policies towards a more market oriented approach, for example the 
deregulation of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy in 1992. European farmers of today 
face a price risk that was previously absorbed by the market and price support policies 
(Matthews, 2010).  
 
The price volatility for grain has increased substantially during the last five years and it is 
believed that relatively high price volatility will characterize grain markets in the future 
(Davelid et al., 2010). As shown in Figure 2, the volatility in spot prices for winter wheat has 
increased significantly during the period 1995-2005. Risk is a factor which influences 
decision-making as most individuals are risk averse when faced with risky incomes or wealth 
outcomes (Hardaker et. al., 1997). The Findus pea producers’ perception of the current 
pricing model and their expected utility of producing peas are affected by their risk exposure 
and the farmers’ degree of risk aversion (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2. Historical spot prices on the Swedish market for winter wheat and historical average prices for Findus 
pea producers. Source: www, Jordbruksverket, 1, 2012; pers. comn., Persson; own modification. 
 
It can be questioned whether the current pricing model in the Findus pea production contract 
is optimal due to changed market conditions. The increased volatility in grain markets implies 
that the pricing of Findus peas has become more difficult and that the volatility in pea prices 
also has increased. The Findus pea price negotiated in January is set partly in relation to the 
expected value of producing alternative crops such as malting barley. The expected value is 
based on historical gross margins. At the beginning of the growing season, the farmer chooses 
what crops to grow. The choice is dependent on crop rotation considerations but also on the 
expected value of different crops. If product prices for alternative crops increase during the 
current growing season in relation to last year’s prices, it is reasonable to assume that some 
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pea producers are dissatisfied with the pea price they receive. As shown in Figure 2, this may 
have been the case 2007, when the pea price was substantially lower than the winter wheat 
price. Therefore, the volatility in grain prices makes it difficult to evaluate the profitability of 
Findus peas relative to alternative crops, prior to the growing season. Consequently, the 
relative value of producing peas for Findus is uncertain in comparison to the value of 
producing alternative crops, e.g. winter wheat, malting barley, rapeseed etc. Figure 3 
graphically explains the pea producers’ decision making process before signing the pea 
production contract. The pea producers’ dissatisfaction may be avoided if the pea price to a 
greater extent follows the price movements of grain prices. Accordingly, it is interesting to 
study the effects on the pea producers’ expected utility if the pea price to a greater extent is 
correlated with grain prices.  
 
 
Figure 3. The figure visualizes the farmers’ decision making process when he/she decides to produce peas or not 
to produce peas. Source: own modification. 
Moreover, the increased price volatility in grain prices suggests that grain farmers’ risk 
exposure has increased. There is an already existing significant production risk associated 
with green pea production because of high yield variability due to agronomic reasons (pers. 
comn., Persson & Påhlsson, 2012). Due to the increased price risk in crops sold on the open 
market and a significant production risk in pea production, farmers that produce peas on 
contract for Findus, face an increased total risk as grain farmers. There are many ways in 
which grain farmers can reduce their overall risk exposure; one way may be to reduce the risk 
of growing Findus peas. If Findus is less risk averse than the pea producers, the processor 
should bear a large share of the risk (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Hence, it is 
interesting to examine the distribution of risk between Findus and the pea producers in the 
current contract and whether the risk carried by the pea producers can be reduced. Moreover, 
it would be interesting to examine the change in the pea producers’ return if Findus peas are 
not grown. This would give an indication of the value of incorporating Findus peas in the crop 
rotation system.  
 
 5 
 
1.3 Aim  
The aim of this study is to examine, from the producer’s viewpoint, the current production 
contract between Findus and the pea producers and whether there are alternative pea pricing 
models that are more effective, for both contract parties, given volatile agricultural 
commodity markets. 
 
More specifically, the aim is to examine if there are alternative pricing models that are more 
beneficial for both Findus and the pea producers. Reasonably, an alternative pricing model 
will not be accepted by both contract parties unless they are better off, i.e. both parties’ 
expected utilities are increased (Petersson & Andersson, 1996).  
 
The research questions are formulated as follows:  
• How does the current contract and pricing model function from the pea producers’ 
perspective?  
• Based on historical data, how do the pricing models affect the pea producers’ risk and 
return?  
• What is the value of incorporating Findus peas in the crop rotation?  
Our study examines the value of Findus peas in relation to alternative crops in the crop 
rotation. As Findus peas is only one crop in a pea producer’s crop rotation, the value of 
Findus peas must be set in relation to the value of alternative crops. Thus, it is important to 
take all marketing and crop alternatives into account when modeling the managerial situation 
of a pea producer. The study is aimed at the following groups of readers: Findus, the Findus’ 
pea producers, agricultural consultants and students of production economics and farm 
management. The study is relevant for Findus and the Findus’ pea producers as the study’s 
intention is to examine if the current contract situation between the pea producers’ and Findus 
can be improved. Agricultural consultants in Skåne can use the thesis to gain additional 
knowledge of the value of incorporating Findus peas in the crop rotation.  
1.4 Delimitations 
The current production contract is examined from the pea producers’ perspective as farm-
level data is used. The impact of the alternative pricing models on the pea producers’ risk 
exposure and return is therefore examined. In order to take preceding crop benefits into 
account and thus calculate the value of incorporating Findus peas in the crop rotation, only 
yield data with a known crop rotation can be used. Hence, data from a case farm is used. The 
model that is developed is valid explicitly for a single case and cannot directly be applied on 
other farm enterprises with a different crop rotation system than the case farm. However, as 
the typical crop rotation in the south western part of Skåne is rather straightforward with a 
limited number of choices, the generalizability of our results are tested (pers. comn., 
Yngvesson, 2012). The purpose of using a case farm is mainly to illuminate the typical effects 
of the different pricing models, not to determine the “exact” effects in monetary terms.        
 
1.5 Outline 
The chapter outline is illustrated in Figure 4 below. Chapter 1, Introduction describes the 
current Findus pea production contract and introduces the problem regarding increased price 
volatility. The literature review describes relevant literature regarding applied contract design, 
explanatory factors of risk management and production contract pricing strategies. 
Theoretical framework gives an introduction to the theory of expected utility theory and risk 
preferences, which form the foundation for the mathematical programming model. It also 
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describes the mean-variance (EV) approach and the quadratic risk programing model used. 
Method describes the risk attitude measurement scale used and how the survey was 
conducted. In addition, the applied quadratic risk programing model and the assumptions and 
calculations made are described. Chapter 5, Results, presents the results of the survey and the 
mathematical programming model. In the Analysis and discussion chapter the results are 
discussed in relation to the literature and theory presented in chapter 2 and 3. In addition, the 
generalizability of the results is evaluated. Finally, Chapter 7, Conclusions, gives the 
conclusions of this study as well as identifies further research areas.  
 
Figure 4. Illustration of the thesis outline. Source: own modification. 
Chapter 2 
Literature 
review Chapter 1 
Introduction Chapter 3 
Theoretical 
framework 
Chapter 4 
Method 
Chapter 6 
Analysis and 
discussion 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
Chapter 5 
Results 
 7 
 
2 Literature review 
The aim of the literature review is to provide a context in which the Findus contract and the 
Findus pea producers’ risk attitudes can be understood. An extensive literature search was 
conducted; several databases and different combinations of relevant search terms were used. 
However, few empirical studies about production contracts and contract design which are 
relevant for this study were found. No empirical studies that examine an agricultural 
commodity marketed through a production contract in relation to alternative farm activities 
were found. Also, few empirical studies analyzing alternative marketing approaches in 
agricultural production furnish an overall framework (King et. al., 1995). Commonly, the 
marketing alternatives are treated separately. In addition, only one study that deals with 
agricultural commodities only traded through production contracts were found. This may be 
explained by that information on contract terms and design is difficult to access due to the 
proprietary nature of contracts (Sykuta & James, 2004; Vermeulen et. al., 2008).  
 
2.1 Applied Contract Design  
Contract theory is to a large extent based on agency theory and transaction cost theory 
(Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Agency theory tries to determine the most effective 
contract, given different goals or risk attitudes of the contract parties, in order to regulate the 
relationship between the principal and the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, 
agency theory provides a theoretical framework for the design of optimal incentive schemes. 
Transaction costs arise from the need to bring sellers and buyers together and to define 
contract details, such as price and terms of payment (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Hence, 
minimization of transaction costs is essential in contract design. The study by Bogetoft & 
Ballebye Olesen (2002; 2004) is the only study found that in detail examines a pea production 
contract. The contract studied is a production contract between the Danish processor Danisco 
Foods and its pea producers. The contract is no longer in use as the Belgium company Ardo 
Group acquired the enterprise from Danisco Foods in the early 2000’s (Lindgaard, 2001).   
Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen (2002; 2004) discuss three central features of contract design: 
motivation, coordination and transactions costs. Motivation is the feature of contract design 
with greatest importance for this study as it mainly focuses on the pricing of the Findus pea 
production contract. In this section, the Danisco Foods production contract is described in 
detail, especially the pricing model, in order to compare the Danisco Foods contract with the 
Findus production contract.  
 
Production of green peas for consumption demands highly accurate coordination as the timing 
of the harvest is crucial to the outcome (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Accurate 
planning is needed as harvesting must be synchronized to match the capacity of the combines 
and the capacity of the factory, whilst considering transport time from field to factory and the 
ripeness of the peas. To ensure a highly accurate coordination and an efficient harvest 
process, centralized decision-making is required. A centralized decision structure can be 
considered as the classical decision model within contract farming and is often used when a 
processor buys produce from a large number of small firms (Bijman, 2008). Centralized 
decision-making in the Danisco Foods’ contract implies that the processor is in charge of 
most decisions such as amount of seed used, choice of variety, time of planting, production 
standard and harvesting. The pea producers in Denmark are organized in the Pea Growers’ 
Association (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). By organizing the pea producers in a 
growers’ association, transaction costs are minimized as individual contracts with each 
producer are avoided. Instead, the Pea Growers’ Association represents the producers in the 
contract negotiation with Danisco Foods. 
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Production contracts need to be designed in such a way that both parties are given a private 
interest in acting so that the integrated profit is maximized as people are assumed to act 
opportunistic (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Consequently, motivation is a fundamental 
element of contract design. The contract must provide both parties with profits or utilities at 
least equal to what the parties could obtain if not entering the contract, i.e. their reservation 
values. A farmer’s reservation value can be defined as the profit from his/hers best alternative 
option. Farmers have different reservation values as their soil quality, skills and cost structure 
etc. differs. Hence, the price and pricing model are central in contract design. From the 
processor’s viewpoint an optimal contract design would be if all the contracted producers 
receive exactly their individual reservation value. This is however not desirable if a processor 
contracts hundreds of producers as the transaction costs would exceed the benefits. Instead, 
the same contract has to be offered to all producers. The result is that skilled, low cost and/or 
best soil producers receive a payment higher than their reservation value, i.e. they receive 
more than they could obtain from an alternative use of their land.   
 
Payments exceeding the producers’ reservation values can be reduced by conditioning the 
payment to the producer on a signal that is associated with the producer’s type, i.e. his or hers 
reservation value (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). In agricultural production contracts, 
this is often achieved by letting the compensation be based on the output produced. This 
compensation scheme ensures that producers with large output potentials receive a high 
compensation. However, there is often an element of randomness affecting the relationship 
between actions and output (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2002). This implies that the 
incentives based on output, exposes the producer to risk, as the quantity produced partially is 
determined by factors that the producer cannot control i.e. weather conditions and pests. The 
more risk-averse producers are, the larger is the cost of exposing them to risk.  
2.1.1 Risk Sharing  
Production contracts can be seen as risk-shifting contracts, in which the risk-shifter pays a 
type of premium to the risk-taker. In return, the risk-shifter obtains a guaranteed price 
(Meuwissen et. al., 2001). To minimize the cost of risk and uncertainty is an essential feature 
of contract design (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Generally, it can be assumed that the 
processor Danisco Foods has a weaker risk aversion and is a cheaper risk bearer than the pea 
producers. Danisco Foods has several other production lines and hence a high level of 
diversification. Furthermore, Dansico Foods is one division of the large corporation Danisco 
A/S. Thus, the owners of Danisco can diversify their investments in the capital market. As 
yields of different crops are positively correlated, farmers do not have the same possibility to 
diversify their production. However, it is not appropriate placing the entire risk on the 
cheapest risk bearer as this may have a negative effect on the other party’s incentives to 
maximize the integrated profit.  
 
Agricultural risk, i.e. variance in farm-level income, can be divided into price risk and 
production risk (Chavas et. al., 2010). Production risk can be divided into general production 
risk and idiosyncratic risk (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). General production risk refers 
to weather conditions, general vermin attacks etc. and idiosyncratic risk is related to those 
factors that affect the pea producers differently, for example weeds. Due to that farmers use 
different pea varieties and plant at different times, the general production risk experienced by 
farmers varies. The cheaper risk bearer, Danisco Foods, should take all risk except some 
element of the idiosyncratic risk as some risk must be borne by the farmers for incentive 
reasons. The payment to an individual pea producer is negatively affected by weed problems 
as this reduces the yield. This provides the producer with incentives to perform appropriate 
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plant protection and thus maximize production. Consequently, the Dansico Foods’ farmers 
bear some element of the idiosyncratic risk.  
 
Danisco Foods bears all price risk as the total payment to the pea producers is independent of 
the processor’s marketing possibilities (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Moreover, 
forward contracts which determine an exact price to be paid, completely eliminate the 
farmer’s price risk as the processor bears all the price risk (Heifner et. al., 1993; Harwood et. 
al., 1999). From the starting point of harvest, Danisco Foods bears all production risk as the 
processor faces the loss if the peas cannot be harvested as green peas and therefore not sold at 
a premium (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). The payment to the farmers is set in two 
steps. First, the factory payment, i.e. the total payment that Danisco Foods pays to the 
farmers, is determined. The factory payment is based on the mean yield among all farmers. 
Second, the factory payment is allocated among the pea producers. The farmers are grouped 
so that producers in the same group use the same pea variety, plant at the same time and 
experience the same conditions. The payment is first allocated among each group and 
thereafter allocated to the individual farmers and the average payment should be equal 
between all groups. This setup implies that groups with high production obtain a lower pea 
price per kg than groups with low total production. Hence, a high yielding producer increases 
the production in his or her group and lowers the group’s price per kg. Accordingly, the 
incentives to maximize production are lowest for farmers with high production and highest 
for farmers with low production. As a result, farmers with the best soils do not obtain their 
reservation value and their motivation to grow peas for Dansico Foods is low. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates Danisco Foods’ factory payment and the division of general production 
risk. The Danisco pea producers are guaranteed a minimum payment of 4800 DKK per 
hectare (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Consequently, the processor bears the general 
production risk at very low yields. The processor pays one price per kg for the first 5500 kg 
per hectare and another lower price per kg for the residual quantity. At an average production 
above 5500 kg per hectare, the processor bears much of the general production risk as 
fluctuations in yields above this level have a large influence on the revenues to Danisco, but 
somewhat modest impact on the payment to the farmers. Danisco would have to take all 
general production risk if the factory payment was independent of the pea production. On the 
other hand, the slope of the factory payment would be the same as the marginal value of peas 
to Danisco Foods, if the farmers would have to bear all general production risk. The Danisco 
Foods’ pea producers are paid in accordance with their performance in relation to the rest of 
the farmers in their group, rather than in absolute terms. Hence, an individual producer’s 
performance is measured in comparison to other producers with the same prerequisites. 
Setting up the contract in such a way protects the farmers from some general production risk, 
without reducing the incentives for motivation. Nevertheless, they are not completely 
protected as the factory payment depends on the mean yield of the farmers.  
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Figure 5. The Danisco Foods’ factory payment and the general production risk. Source: Bogetoft & Ballebye 
Olesen, 2004, p. 86; own modification.  
 
There is a conflict of interest between Danisco Foods and the farmers (Bogetoft & Ballebye 
Olesen, 2004). In general, to utilize the capacity of the factory, the processor wants to 
maximize the length of the harvesting period. Hence, some farmers have to plant very early 
and some have to plant very late, even though this decreases their yields. In turn, the farmers 
want to plant at a time so that their yields are maximized. The extended harvesting period 
results in a reduction of the total factory payment to the farmers. However, a production plan 
can be implemented without too much protest as the loss caused by planting at a less 
favorable time is shared between all farmers. 
 
2.2 Explanatory Factors of Risk Management 
This section forms an academic framework for the questionnaire used in the telephone survey 
to estimate the Findus pea producers’ risk attitudes.  
The way in which farmers handle risks associated with price volatility in commodity markets 
depend largely on the farmer’s risk attitude (Pennings, 1998). Farm enterprises can in most 
cases be characterized as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Pennings & Garcia, 
2004). The decision process in SMEs differs from the one in large enterprise with different 
functional departments. Typically, the management of SMEs rests on one single manager and 
the ownership of SMEs is usually concentrated. Moreover, farm enterprises often are family 
run. Family firms are often described as conservative, resistant to change and introverted 
(Naldi et al., 2007). In such an organizational structure, a farm manager’s risk aversion can be 
a strong motivation to manage risk (Pennings & Garcia, 2004). The central determinants of 
risk management behavior are risk attitude and risk perception. The concept of risk attitude 
refers to that mangers can be risk-averse, risk-neural or risk-seeking. However, before a 
manager is able to react, risk must be perceived. Risk perception can be defined as a 
manager’s estimation of the degree of risk inherent in a situation. A manager will perceive the 
market as less risky if he or she is able to predict the market price of a commodity and will 
thus not attempt to reduce risk to the same extent as a manager who is not able to predict 
market prices. Managers will attempt to reduce risk by risk management strategies only when 
 11 
 
they perceive risk and are risk averse. Pennings and Garcia (2004) show that the interaction 
between risk attitude and risk perception is the primary explanatory factor of derivative use. 
Risk attitude and risk perception are psychological constructs and play an important part in 
the SME manager’s decision making process and use of different pricing strategies. 
There are several variables explaining farm manager’s risk attitudes (Pennings & Smidts, 
2000). Previous studies show that managers’ innovativeness and market orientation are linked 
to their risk-taking behavior (Naldi, et al., 2007; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Innovativeness 
refers to the degree to which managers are open to new experiences and possess the ability to 
convert information about new ideas, products or services for their own use (Pennings, 1998). 
Responsiveness to changing market conditions often implies introduction or adoption of new 
products and services (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). But there are risks associated with new 
products and services as these are less proven and the risk of failure is high. Hence, the 
manager’s responsiveness to dynamic and uncertain market conditions are reflected in the 
manager’s innovativeness and market orientation. In a study of Pennings & Smidts (2000), 
farm managers’ risk attitudes were measured by studying a set of observable indicators: 
innovativeness, market orientation as well as revealed market behavior in terms of choice of 
pricing strategy. The authors conclude that farm managers who define themselves as risk-
averse tend to be less market-oriented, less innovative, and more committed to reduce 
variations in profit margin. 
2.3 Pricing Models Used in Production Contracts  
In this section, literature about various pricing models used in agricultural commodity 
production contracts is presented. A Findus pea producer cannot choose how to market his or 
hers peas as there is no spot market for green peas. Thus, if a farmer wants to produce green 
peas, he or she must produce peas on contract for Findus. Accordingly, only pricing models 
common in production contracts are evaluated. The alternative pricing models evaluated in 
the QRP model are designed on the basis of the literature presented in this section. 
Pricing of production contracts are relatively unknown due to the proprietary nature of 
contracts (Sykuta & James, 2004; Vermeulen et. al., 2008). However, compensation is most 
commonly based on performance and contracts often contain incentive clauses (MacDonald 
et. al., 2004). Production contracts often do not specify the price of the commodity, but 
instead provide a price formula (Heifner et. al., 1993). This is referred to as deferred pricing 
and the price in such a contract is based on a cash or futures price that is observed at a later 
point in time. Deferred pricing is common in agricultural production contracts and allows the 
farmer to speculate on a price increase while the farmer is guaranteed outlet for his or hers 
produce. Deferred pricing formulas commonly specify a certain base price and a differential 
relative to the base price. Often, a quotation for spot delivery of the same commodity at a 
central location serves as the base price. Deferred pricing formulas based on cash quotations 
are regularly used in production contracts for broilers, eggs and vegetables for processing.     
   
Another pricing model used in production contracts is window pricing, which is a common 
risk management tool in North American hog production (Unterschultz et. al., 1998). A 
window contract is formulated with a secure minimum price floor and a maximum ceiling 
price. This type of contract can also be understood as equivalent to a situation where the 
producer purchases a put option from the processor, i.e. the contract provider, and the 
processor purchases a call option with identical value from the producer. When the reference 
market price for the commodity defined in the contract falls within the window, the producer 
obtains the reference price and thus bears all the price risk (Shao & Roe, 2003). When the 
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reference price falls above the window, the processor pays the ceiling price. Correspondingly, 
when the reference price falls below the window, the processor pays the floor price and price 
risk is thus shifted to the processor. The reference price is commonly based on a spot or 
futures quotation of the same commodity. The use of window contracts provide farmers with 
an instrument that protects him/her from great losses but still gives the farmer the advantage 
of gaining from upward market movements as forward contracts do not. “Conceptually, the 
producer removes price risk below the window floor in exchange for giving up price gains 
above the window ceiling” (Unterschultz et. al., 1998, p. 724). Depending on the price range 
between the price floor and the ceiling, the window contract is comparable to either a hedge 
position established using futures or a straight cash position. The first case occurs when there 
is a narrow price range between the price floor and the ceiling and the latter case occurs when 
there is a wide price range.  
The effectiveness of window contracts depends on their price and design, and must be 
beneficial for both the producer and the processor (Shao & Roe, 2003). The key issue in 
window contracts is how to determine the floor price and ceiling price of the contract. In 
existing industry contracts, the selection of the price window is often arbitrary (Unterschultz 
et al., 1998). Floor and ceiling prices are often set symmetrically around a predetermined spot 
price or around the futures price of the same commodity. In the study by Unterschultz et al., 
(1998) two methods for determining the price window are proposed: a confidence interval 
approach and a break-even approach. In the first method, the floor price is determined by the 
lower bound of the confidence interval of the distribution of the futures price. In the second 
method, the floor price is determined by the estimated breakeven price for hog finishing. 
Moreover, the price range is set by equating the premiums paid and received. Both this 
methods are defined as fixed-window contracts (Shao & Roe, 2003). Another type is moving-
window contracts, which specify a floor price as a moving average of input prices. For 
instance, the floor price may be defined by a linear function of the sixth month moving 
average feed price whilst the ceiling price equals the floor price plus a fixed number. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
The aim of the theoretical framework, which forms the foundation of the mathematical 
programming model, is to provide tools for analyzing the current pricing model and the 
alternative pricing models. Being a farmer is connected with risks, in particular price risk and 
production risk. Hence, risk is associated with many of the decisions that a farmer needs to 
take. Ignorance of risk aversive behavior in farm planning models often result in plans that are 
not acceptable by the farmer or is disconnected to the decisions he or she actually makes 
(Hazell & Norton, 1986). The theoretical framework in this study explains the nature of 
decision making under uncertainty and is based on expected utility theory and risk 
preferences. Hence, these methods provide a basis for analyzing various types of contracts 
and pricing schemes. Accordingly, the theoretical framework is highly relevant within the 
context of the chosen problem.  
 
3.1 Expected Utility Theory and Risk Preferences 
A common approach for evaluating the impacts of risky choices on a farmer’s wellness is by 
means of expected utility (E(U)) (Meuwissen et. al., 2001). Expected utility theory is based 
on the criterion that rational decision makers always attempt to maximize their expected 
utility function (Varian, 1992). Utility maximization can be seen as a criterion for how 
choices are made by the producer. Individuals have different utility functions as people in 
general have different risk attitudes. Individuals’ risk attitudes are usually explained 
graphically by utility curves (Hardaker et. al., 1997; Debertin, 1986; Varian, 1992). 
Individuals are assumed to prefer more wealth compared to less wealth and therefore the 
utility curve will have a positive slope, as shown in Figure 6 (Hardaker et. al., 1997). In 
mathematical form, the expression may be written as: 
𝑈(′)(𝑤) > 0  (1) 
If the first derivative of the utility function is positive for all w, it represents the relationship 
that more wealth or income is preferred to less (Hardaker et. al., 1997; Varian, 1992). Hence, 
the first derivative demonstrates how the marginal utility is affected if wealth increases with 
Δw. Different individuals can be described as risk averse, risk neural or risk loving. Most 
people are risk averse when faced with risky incomes or wealth outcomes (Hardaker et. al., 
1997). A risk averse farmer prefers a certain income in relation to an equally large income 
with a larger variance in income. This can graphically be shown as a concave function 
showing a decreasing marginal utility for an increasing wealth, as shown in Figure 6. The 
relationship can also be described by the mathematical equation: 
𝑈(′′)(𝑤) < 0  (2) 
 
Figure 6. Utility function describing a risk averse individual. Source: Hardaker et. al., 1997; own modification. 
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The degree of risk aversion varies among individuals and can be calculated by using the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (Varian 1992; Hardaker et. al., 1997). 
𝑟𝑎(𝑤) = −𝑈(′′)(𝑤)𝑈(′)(𝑤)  (3) 
ra(w) is labeled the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, CARA, and describes the absolute 
risk aversion of an individual (Hardaker et. al., 1997). If the coefficient assumes a positive 
value it indicates that the individual is risk averse. The basic assumption of CARA is that the 
preferred option in a risky situation is the same regardless of if there would be an addition or 
subtraction of a constant amount to the overall wealth. But the CARA assumption does not 
hold for all conditions. In general, it can be stated that decision makers have a tendency to 
take larger risks when they can afford it. In other words, diminishing absolute risk aversion is 
noticeable when companies or individuals have a secure financial position. Another condition 
for when CARA does not hold is when ra(w) is expressed in different monetary units and 
absolute risk aversion functions are compared between countries with different currencies. To 
enable the calculation even under the above conditions the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, CRRA can be used. The measurement is calculated with the following equation: 
𝑟𝑟(𝑤) = 𝑤 ∗ 𝑟𝑎(𝑤) (4) 
In this calculation the preferred option amongst a set of risky alternatives does not change 
when multiplying the wealth with a constant amount (Hardaker et. al., 1997). In order to 
interpret the result, Anderson and Dillon (1992) suggest that the degree of risk aversion may 
be characterized in terms of the relative risk aversion coefficient rr(w). Hardaker et al (1997, 
p. 109) have compiled the information as follows: 
1. rr(w) = 0.5, hardly risk averse at all 
2. rr(w) = 1.0, slightly risk avers 
3. rr(w) = 2.0, relatively risk averse 
4. rr(w) = 3.0, very risk averse 
5. rr(w) = 4.0, extremely risk averse 
Expected utility (E(U)) can be translated into a monetary measure defined as the certainty 
equivalent (CE) (Hardaker et. al., 1997). The certainty equivalent for every decision with 
risky payoffs denotes the certain sum of money, which a decision-maker would value as 
equivalent to the uncertain outcome of the risky prospect. CEs vary between different 
decision makers as people in general rarely have identical attitudes to risk, i.e. utility 
functions. To use CEs of risky alternatives instead of expected utility values are advantageous 
as CEs are more easily understood and can be quantitatively compared.  
 
Risk averse individuals require compensation in order to accept alternatives with risky 
prospects (Hedberg, 1996; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The compensation must be based on 
the riskiness of the uncertain outcome and the individuals’ degree of risk aversion to ensure 
that the expected utility of the risky alternative is higher than for the risk free one. This 
difference in expected utility between a risky and a risk free alternative is referred to as a risk 
premium. By definition, the certainty equivalent equals the expected income E(π) minus the 
risk premium (Hardaker et. al., 1997). This relationship can mathematically be described as:  
𝐶𝐸 = 𝐸�𝑈(𝜋)� = 𝐸(𝜋) − 𝜑
2
∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋) (5) 
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Where: 
E(U(π))=  The producer’s expected utility of income from labor and capital 
E(π)= Expected income from labor and capital 
φ = Coefficient of absolute risk aversion  
Var(π)= Variance of the producer’s income from labor and capital 
Equation 5 gives the expected mean-variance (EV) approach originally formulated by 
Markowitz and later developed by Freund. The EV approach is often used in portfolio 
analysis and can be applied in agriculture and farming in the context of “optimal” farm plans.        
3.2 Mean-variance (EV) Analysis 
Farm plans consist of different activities on farm level, e.g. different crops that can be 
produced on the farm. One principle of decision making under risk is that a farm plan has no 
certain income each year (Hazell & Norton, 1986). Rather, there are numerous possible 
income outcomes and in the context of mathematical programming, the actual outcome 
depends on the product sum of all cj and xj coefficients in the model. In mean-variance (EV) 
analysis, it is assumed that among alternative farm plans, a farmer’s preferences are based on 
expected income E(𝜋) and the related variance in income, Var(𝜋). According to the EV 
efficiency criterion, a risk averse farmer prefers farm plan A compared to farm plan B if the 
expected income of farm plan A is greater than or equal to the expected income of farm plan 
B, and the variance of A is less than or equal to the variance of B (Hardaker et. al., 1997). 
Hence, the model assumes that farmers trade expected income for reduced variance. Optimal 
farm plans are characterized by a minimum variance Var(𝜋) for an associated income level 
E(π). The efficiency criterion only holds if the farmer has an outcome distribution that is 
normal or if the farmer’s utility function is quadratic.  
By the use of quadratic programming, optimal farm plans can be derived as a combination of 
risky prospects (Hardaker et. al., 1997). The equation calculating the mean and variance for 
any portfolio mix involving xj units of prospects j is given by:  
𝛱 = ∑𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑐𝑗 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋) = ∑𝑗∑𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑥𝑖 (6) 
Where: 
xj = units, i.e. hectares, of activity j 
cj = expected average gross margin of activity j   
covji = covariance of gross margins for activities j and i 
 
In the context of agriculture and choice of crop rotation, there are a number of constraints, 
such as agronomic, land, capital and labor constraints, affecting the optimal farm plan, i.e. xj 
(Hardaker et. al., 1997). The possible combinations of prospects form a convex curve that 
illustrates the feasible setting under given resource constraints, shown in Figure 7. The curve 
forms an efficient frontier and represents an efficient investment portfolio. Thus, any point on 
the frontier denotes an optimal farm plan and represents a solution for when the variance is 
minimized given an expected income and/or points for which the expected income is 
maximized for a given variance in income. Which specific farm plan that is chosen by a 
farmer is mathematically derived by the tangent to an efficient frontier. In the point of 
tangency, the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is equal to the slope of the 
efficient frontier. An individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion can be derived by using 
Equation 4, which can be rewritten as:  
𝑟𝑎(𝑤) = 𝑟𝑟(𝑤)/𝑤 (7) 
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This definition of ra(w) can be used when assessing risky prospects with small payoffs in 
relation to wealth, w (Hardaker et. al., 1997). However, if risky prospects are assessed to have 
large payoffs relative to w, ra(w) can be derived by the assumption of permanent income (Y). 
In this case, wealth is equal to the capitalized value of future permanent income flows. 
Equation 7 can then be rewritten as:  
𝑟𝑎(𝑌) = 𝑟𝑟(𝑤)/𝑌 (8) 
A very risk averse individual has a steep tangent, 𝜑1
2
, and chooses point 1 in Figure 7, with a 
low expected income and a low degree of risk. On the other hand, a somewhat risk averse 
individual has a less steep tangent, 𝜑2
2
, and chooses point 2 in the figure. Points above the 
curve are not feasible as the constraints are not fulfilled and points below the curve are not 
optimal as it is possible to reach a higher degree of utility with the same degree of risk.  
 
Figure 7. The tangency points between the efficient frontier and the tangents illustrate the optimal farm plan for 
two individuals with different degrees of risk aversion. A very risk averse individual prefers point 1 whilst a 
somewhat risk averse individual prefers point 2. Source: own modification. 
3.3 Applied QRP Model 
The mathematical programming model used in this study is a quadratic risk programming 
(QRP) model, which is based on mean-variance (EV) analysis. The optimization problem is 
formulated by combining Equations 5 and 6, which results in the following objective 
function:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑍𝑗 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑝𝑝𝑝=1 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑛𝑗=1 − 𝜑2 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋) (9) 
Subject to 
∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗𝑝 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 , ∀   𝑖 = 1 …𝑚           𝑥𝑗𝑝 ≥ 0, ∀  𝑗 = 1 … 𝑛 
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Where: 
Max Zj =  expected maximized utility  
cjp = expected average gross margin of crop j with the preceding crop p. 
xjp = units, i.e. hectares grown, of crop j with the preceding crop p. n is the number of 
possible activities, so that j = 1 to n. p is the number of possible preceding crops 
so that p = 1 to P. 
φ =  coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
Var(π) = variance in profits  
aij =  activity j’s use of resource i. m is the amount of resources, so that i = 1 to m 
bi = availability of resource i  
   
The cj values are based on historical yield data, cost structures and output prices. The yield 
and cost structure data used in our QRP model is based on data collected from a case farm. In 
order to represent the case farm’s resource base and activities, a number of constraints are 
defined, see Chapter 4, section 4.2 Quadratic Risk Programming Model.  
 
The QRP problem is solved by maximising expected utility of net farm income for various 
values of absolute risk aversion coefficients ra, i.e. φ. Optimal farm plans are derived for each 
pricing model, thus efficient frontiers are derived representing the feasible setting given cj-
values and restrictions. The efficient frontiers indicate how the Findus pea producers would 
be affected by the, in this study, proposed new pricing models. Figure 8 exemplifies two 
different efficient frontiers given two different pricing models. Which farm plan or pricing 
model that is optimal depends on the slope of the tangent, i.e. the pea producers’ degree of 
risk aversion. Given the slope of the tangents illustrated in the figure, point 2 is preferred to 
point 1 as this point gives a higher level of utility.        
 
The efficient frontiers are affected by the cj-value for each farm activity, variances in gross 
margins and covariances of gross margins between different farm activities. The variances 
and covariances form a covariance-variance matrix of gross margins (GM) per hectare for all 
farm activities; see Appendix 1 for the covariance-variance matrix. The tangent to each 
efficient frontier is derived by using Equation 5 and 8 presented in Chapter 3. The latter 
equation is used to convert the pea producers’ coefficient of relative risk aversion, derived 
from the survey results, to their coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ra(Y)). Equation 8 is 
used as crop production is the dominating activity at the case farm. Hence, the risky prospect 
assessed has a large payoff relative to w. Y, i.e. permanent income, in Equation 8, is 
represented by the case farm’s expected net farm income for each pricing model. The 
tangency point of each efficient frontier equals the optimal farm plan which maximizes the 
Findus pea producers’ expected net farm income given their degree of risk aversion.  
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Figure 8. Different efficient frontiers plotted in the same figure. The optimal solution is given by the slope of the 
tangent. Source: own modification. 
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4 Method 
The overall research approach can be viewed as quantitative and the methods applied consist 
of a telephone survey and a quadratic risk programming model.  
 
In fixed or quantitative research designs, the study is fixed prior to the main stage of the data 
collection phase (Robson, 2002). Fixed designs are theory driven, which means that the 
method is determined by theory as the variables to be included in the study must be specified 
in advance. Thus, the researcher must have a deep understanding of the phenomenon studied 
prior to the data collection phase. Most commonly, data are numerical. In flexible or 
qualitative research designs, data are often non-numerical, i.e. in the form of words. 
Moreover, flexible designs develop during the data collection phase. A fixed research design 
was considered to be appropriate in our study as both the survey method and the mathematical 
programming method are theory driven. Thus, the applied methods are based on the literature 
and theoretical framework presented in chapters 2 and 3. In addition, the study focuses on the 
outcome, not the process, which indicates the use of a fixed design (Robson, 2002). 
Quantitative methods are concerned about the common, the average or the representative of a 
phenomenon. The intention of this study is to assess the outcome for the Findus’ pea 
producers, as a group, if alternative pricing models are introduced.     
 
4.1 Survey 
The aim of the survey is to collect data about the Findus pea producers’ motivation for 
growing peas and to estimate the farmers’ risk attitudes. The Findus pea producers’ risk 
attitudes are assessed since the farmers’ degree of risk aversion affects the choice of optimal 
farm plan on the efficient frontier (Hardaker et. al., 1997). It can be assumed that the pea 
producers have individual utility curves and thus individual risk attitudes (Varian, 1992). Yet, 
an overall degree of risk aversion valid for all Findus pea producers is estimated in 
accordance with literature (Pennings, 1998; Pennings & Smidts, 2000). The Findus pea 
producers’ overall degree of risk aversion is described in terms of the farmers’ coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (rr(w)) and is later converted into their coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion (ra(Y)), which is the risk measure used in Equation 8.    
 
In accordance with literature, the Findus pea producers’ degree of risk aversion is estimated 
by measuring their risk preferences, market orientation and innovativeness (Pennings, 1998; 
Pennings & Smidts, 2000). Data is collected through a survey method. A quantitative 
approach was considered most suitable for collecting data about the pea producers’ opinions 
about the current contract and estimating the pea producers’ degree of risk aversion. 
Moreover, various researchers have previously used quantitative methods for measuring 
managers’ risk attitudes (Pennings, 1998; Pennings & Smidts, 2000; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; 
Naldi et. al., 2007; Meuwissen et. al., 2000).   
 
4.1.1 Choice of the Survey Method 
A telephone survey is a survey method that is becoming increasingly more common (Robson, 
2002). Robson describes telephone surveys as a method that “Provide a means of capitalizing 
on many of the advantages of interview-based surveys while substantially reducing the time 
and resources involved in running face-to-face interviews by cutting out the travel 
requirement” (Robson, 2002, p.253-254). 
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A survey consists most commonly of a questionnaire, largely or wholly comprised of fixed-
choice questions (Robson, 2002). Other common features of a survey are that a small amount 
of data is collected in a standardized form from a reasonably large number of individuals and 
that the sample is representative of a population, which is known. The form of survey 
conducted in this study is telephone interviews. Self-completion questionnaires and face-to-
face interviews were also considered but telephone interviews were considered superior. First, 
the data collection period is relatively short and the cost is low compared to face-to-face 
interviews (Robson, 2002). Furthermore, telephone interviews enabled us to include more 
respondents in the sample than would be possible if doing face-to-face interviews. The 
likelihood of errors in generalizing decreases when the relative size of the sample increases. 
After a discussion with statisticians at the Department of Economics it was concluded that a 
sufficient sample size was 10% of the whole population.  
 
Face-to-face interviews could also have been problematic as the survey was conducted in 
April, a period when farmers in southern Sweden usually are busy with spring tillage and 
planting, which could have affected the response rate negatively. An important advantage of 
telephone interviews compared to self-completion questionnaires is a higher response rate 
(Robson, 2002). In addition, both Findus and the Pea Producer Association believed that the 
response rate would be the highest if using a telephone survey compared to self-completion 
questionnaires (pers. comn., Persson & Påhlsson, 2012; Svegrup, 2012). Telephone interviews 
also allow the respondents to ask questions about the questionnaire and the study, which was 
believed to increase the validity, i.e. that the statements or questions really measure what they 
claim to measure (Robson, 2002).   
 
4.1.2 The Risk Attitude Scale 
The scale designed for measuring the pea producers’ risk attitudes in this project is based on a 
study by Pennings (1998), which investigates Dutch farmers’ risk attitudes in the market for 
hedging services. Two major approaches of risk attitude measurements can be identified in 
the literature: measures derived from psychometrics and measures constructed using the 
expected utility framework (Pennings & Smidts, 2000). In the study by Pennings (1998), the 
risk attitudes measurement based on the expected utility framework consisted of a computer-
guided interview in which the interviewee compared a certain outcome to a two-outcome 
lottery. The certain outcome was varied in order to eventually derive the respondent’s utility 
curve. The measures derived from psychometrics were based on the Likert scaling procedure. 
Another study by Meuwissen et. al. (2000) investigates the perceived risk and risk 
management among Dutch livestock farmers by descriptive analysis. The respondents were 
asked to answer statements regarding their attitudes towards risk relative to other farmers with 
respect to production, marketing, financial issues, farming in general and if they feel that they 
in general are willing to assume more risks than other farmers. Most questions in their survey 
were closed questions and mainly formulated as Likert-type five point scale statements. 
 
In our study, risk attitudes were measured by using a psychometric risk attitude scale as this 
method was considered superior to a method based on the expected utility framework due to 
several reasons. The measures constructed using the expected utility framework is time-
consuming and require costly face-to-face interviews whilst psychometric scales can be 
completed fairly quickly and easy. Moreover, we did not have access to the Findus pea 
producers’ email addresses and the producers’ computer skills were unknown. Similarly to 
Pennings (1998), the Likert scaling procedure was selected to measure the pea producers’ risk 
attitudes due to its proven good performance in measuring attitudes. The Likert scale consists 
of a number of statements within the same topic, which the respondent agrees or disagrees 
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with by the help of a five-point or seven-point scale (Ejlertsson, 1996). The extremes are 
defined as strongly disagree respectively strongly agree. In our survey, a five-point scale was 
assessed to contain a sufficient number of answer categories for the respondents to choose 
between. A five-point scale was also considered as the maximum number of answer 
categories that could be used in a telephone survey. 
 
The development of a Likert scale is made according to certain procedures, including 
gathering a pool of items, deciding on a response categorization system, conducting a large 
number of test-interviews and selecting items for a final scale through an item analysis 
(Robson, 2002). Pennings (1998) developed a Likert scale by generating a large pool of items 
related to a number of constructs such as innovativeness and market orientation, see Chapter 
2. The selected items or statements, that were assumed to be related to risk attitude, were 
based both on previous research and formulated by the researcher himself. The initially 
selected items were evaluated through several test-interviews to test the appropriateness of the 
statements. Based on the tests, a final scale was developed through a purification of the initial 
scale. As our statements are based on the items used by Pennings (1998), the above 
mentioned steps of the Likert scaling procedure could be avoided. 
 
When testing the construct validity of the risk attitude measurements used in the study by 
Pennings it was shown that the risk attitude measure derived from psychometrics correlates 
with the attitude and intention variables discussed in the literature chapter (Pennings & 
Smidts, 2000). Hence, a farm manager that describes himself/herself as more risk-averse seem 
to be less market-oriented, less innovative and more committed to reduce variability in profit 
margins.  
The statements and questions of the questionnaire used in the survey are presented in 
Appendix 2. The questionnaire consists of two parts, one measuring the pea producers’ risk 
attitudes and the other one referring to the pea producers’ motivation for growing Findus 
peas. The questions were formulated as simple and short as possible so that they would be 
easily comprehended and so that an interview would not occupy too much time. To test if the 
statements were clear, unambiguous and simple, several test-interviews were conducted by 
both interviewers prior to the actual study. Moreover, this also facilitated our interview 
techniques. The respondents of the test-interviews were asked to give feedback on both the 
questions and how they were asked. The procedure of pre-testing is strongly recommended 
when planning a telephone interview (Robson, 2002). The author also illustrates how 
important it is to use your voice in a correct manner. The researcher should sound interested 
of the answers given by the respondent and talk clearly in a moderate speed. When designing 
interview guides it is common to include questions about the interviewee’s background such 
as age, size of enterprise, position (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). This is conducted both to gather 
information about the characteristics of the population and to start the interview with simple 
questions. A number of introductive questions about age, total cultivated acreage, and number 
of years as a Findus’ pea producer were used in our questionnaire.  
 
4.1.3 Selecting and Contacting Potential Participants  
The total amount of pea producers contracted annually by Findus is approximately 500 
farmers (pers. comn., Persson & Påhlsson, 2012). Findus’ pea producers are divided into four 
groups depending on their geographical location. Accordingly, four lists comprising all pea 
producers contracted by Findus this year was provided by the processor. As soil 
characteristics in the areas differ, it was considered important that the survey would 
encompass producers in all the four regions. The response rate was projected to about 70%. In 
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order to reach 10% of the population, it was therefore concluded that the sample needed to 
consist of 80 pea producers. A probability sampling technique with a systematic sampling 
approach was used to identify the sample (Robson, 2002). Hence, producers were selected by 
choosing every fifth person on the provided lists. Also, the sample contained equally many 
producers from each area. Prior to calling the selected producers, an introduction letter 
presenting the aim of the study, the procedure of the interview, a presentation of ourselves as 
researchers, and the voluntary nature of the study was posted to the producers, see Appendix 
3. To clearly inform the respondent about the study is recommended by most literature within 
research methods. The introduction letter was mailed to the selected pea producers on March 
23rd after retrieving contact information from Findus. To make sure that the farmers had 
received the letter, the telephone interviews were initiated about a week later. The calls began 
with confirming that the right person had answered and that he/she had received the letter. 
The respondent was asked if an interview could be conducted immediately or if he/she wanted 
to make an appointment for the interview. After calling an interviewee notes were taken 
regarding when the person was called, if he/she answered, when the person wanted to be 
called back or if the person did not want to take part in the study. This procedure ensured that 
respondents were not contacted unnecessary or that someone was forgotten.  
 
4.1.4 Analysis of Survey Data  
Telephone calls were made to all the 80 respondents who had received the introduction letter. 
Out of the 80 contacted pea producers, 65 participated in the telephone interview, 13 did not 
answer their phones and 5 chose not to participate. The answers of two participants were 
excluded from the data analysis as these answers were considered to be unreliable. This 
results in an overall response rate of 79%. Out of the overall response rate, the percentage of 
participants from producer group 1, described in section 4.1.3, was 27.0%. Furthermore, the 
percentage of respondents from group 2 was 20.6%, 27.0% from producer group 3 and 25.4% 
from group 4.  
    
The main part of the questions in the questionnaire, performed in this study, was designed as 
closed questions. A questionnaire consisting of closed questions has the advantage of 
facilitating the process of coding, since numbers can be attached to each response option 
already when designing the questionnaire (Robson, 2002). The statements used in the 
questionnaire were treated in the same way. This simplified the summarization of the data 
since it did not require categorization of the answers to a limited number of categories to 
make the material comprehensible. Hence, as the respondents were asked to give standardized 
answers there was no need to further categorize them. Since most of the statements enabled 
that the respondents expressed their opinion on a five degree attitude scale, it was possible to 
enter the answers directly into an Excel file where all necessary calculations could be 
performed. This is in literature referred to as single-transfer coding and is often used for 
coding data from attitude surveys, since it reduces the number of coding errors. 
 
Already when modeling the questionnaire it is important to decide what kind of data that is 
needed and how it should be analyzed (Robson, 2002). To ensure that the questionnaire used 
in this study was formulated so that the analysis would answer the aim we met with 
statisticians at the Department of Economics, SLU, who verified that our questionnaire was 
analyzable. Another important feature of a questionnaire is to make sure that the collected 
data is collected in a form that simplifies the entry process (Robson, 2002).  
 
When carrying out the telephone survey some of the respondents had problems answering 
certain questions. For example, producers who did not grow sugar beets and had not done so 
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in years had difficulties when answering the statement: “The economic value of producing 
peas in comparison to sugar beets is high”. When a pea producer could not answer a 
statement the interview continued and the statement which the farmer could not answer was 
left out when coding the answers. That participants could not answer statements was believed 
to appear randomly and only when the respondent honestly could not answer the statement. 
After collecting all data it was apparent that the answers on questions 5 and 6 were not 
reliable. These questions asked the participant to identify the division of production and price 
risk between the farmer and Findus on a rough scale with three alternatives. The participants 
did not interpret the questions in the same way and most of the respondents had difficulties in 
understanding and answering the questions. It is therefore chosen not to present the answers 
on these two questions. 
 
When measuring constructs within the psychometric approach, such as risk attitude, it is a 
common approach to use scale-mean to numerically compile the answers based on the items 
(Pennings, 1998; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Our data was compiled in accordance with the 
methodology used in Pennings (1998). Hence, statements 7-23 were measured by calculating 
scale-mean and standard deviation for each statement. Questions 1-4, and 24 were compiled 
by summarizing the distribution of answers. In order to compile the statements, the answer 
distributions of some statements were inverted as the statements were formulated with 
different basis. Hence, when compiling statement 14 and 15 for the construct “risk 
preference”, the answers of statement 15, “I am able to predict grain spot prices” were 
inverted as statement 14 is formulated as “I consider the grain market as risky”.  
 
4.2 Quadratic Risk Programming Model 
Mathematical programming is a quantitative approach and has been used since the 1960s to 
model farm-level management decisions (Ekman, 2002). Given limited resources, farm 
models deal with the optimal organization of farm production. They often include a number 
of production activities representing production of different crops and livestock products. By 
the use of quadratic risk programming the optimal solution, i.e. the optimal farm plan can be 
derived (Hardaker et al., 1997). Instead of using a QRP model, linear risk programming 
models could have been used. Software available to handle non-linear objective functions has 
previously been less reliable and less available. Therefore, linear models such as MOTAD 
programming models have been widely used to find linear programming approximations to 
the QRP formulation. A disadvantage of MOTAD models in comparison to QRP models is 
that MOTAD models are less exact and produce more approximative solutions.      
 
The aim of the quadratic risk programming model used in this study is to evaluate how 
different pricing models affect the Findus pea producers’ risk and return and the value of 
incorporating Findus peas in the crop rotation. The input data used in the QRP model is partly 
based on data collected from a case farm. The case farm is situated in Götalands södra 
slättbygder; yield survey district 1211 in accordance with SCB’s division of arable land, see 
Appendix 4 (Statistiska centralbyrån, 2011). The total acreage of the farm is 345 hectares and 
crops grown at the farm are winter wheat, malting barley, sugar beets, winter rapeseed and 
finally green peas grown on contract for Findus. The chosen case farm is a typical farm for 
the south western parts of Skåne as the cropping system and crop rotation are representative 
for the area (pers. comn., Nilsson, C, 2012; pers. comn., Yngvesson, 2012). Moreover, the 
case farm has well-documented yield and output price data for several years.  
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4.2.1 Preceding Crop Benefits 
Research shows that crop yield is affected by the preceding crop (Ohlander, 1996); this 
relation is illustrated in Table 1. The case farm has had a similar crop rotation system during a 
long time period. The yield data of the case farm is affected by the preceding crop in the 
rotation. Thus, to calculate expected average gross margins per hectare, i.e. cj-values, for 
different crops with different preceding crop alternatives, it is necessary to eliminate the 
preceding crop benefits that already exist in the data. This is achieved by calculating the yield 
level under the assumption of monoculture, i.e. only one crop is grown, no crop rotation in 
accordance with Samuelsson (2003). This study focuses on the benefits of including peas in 
the crop rotation system. The model therefore only considers different preceding crop 
alternatives for winter wheat and rapeseed as peas is a reasonable preceding crop alternative 
only for those two crops (Fogelfors, 2001). Malting barley cannot be preceded by peas as the 
protein level of the malting barley then tends to be too high. There are numerous farm 
activities associated with production of winter wheat and rapeseed. Depending on preceding 
crop benefit, four different gross margins per hectare of winter wheat produced and two 
different gross margins per hectare of rapeseed produced are introduced, i.e. Winter wheatpeas, 
Winter wheatrapeseed, Winter wheatmalting barley, Winter wheatwinter wheat, Rapeseedmalting barley and 
Rapeseedpeas.  
 
Table 1. Preceding crop benefit value (kg/hectare). Source: Ohlander, 1996; Blomquist & Larsson, 2009; 
Andersson & Wall, 2009.  
Succeeding crop 
Preceding crop Winter wheat Malting barley Rapeseed Sugar beets Peas 
Winter wheat - 100 1100 4300 1000 
Malting barley 300 - 800 4300 300 
Rapeseed 1100 400 - 3200 1000 
Sugar beets -  800 - - 1000 
Peas 1000 550 300 3200 - 
   
4.2.2 Restrictions 
A number of restrictions affecting the optimal solution must be taken into account when 
designing the model. Table 2 presents the restrictions used in the optimization model. First, 
the occurrence of plant diseases imply that crop rotation is desirable. In accordance with 
Fogelfors (2001), the maximum acreage of rapeseed cannot exceed one sixth of the total 
acreage and the maximum acreage of peas must be less than or equal to one seventh of the 
total acreage. However, the result of the telephone survey, presented in section 5.1, shows that 
the average percentage of peas in the crop rotation system is 7.5% amongst the Findus pea 
producers. With respect to this, the maximum number of hectares of peas that can be 
produced in the model is determined to 7.5% of the total acreage. Second, the maximum 
number of hectares of sugar beets that can be produced in the model equals 20% of the total 
acreage as this corresponds to the average percentage of sugar beets in the crop rotation in 
south western Skåne (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 2012). Third, depending on timely aspects, 
winter crops such as winter wheat and winter rapeseed cannot be grown after sugar beets. The 
acreage of winter wheat is restricted to 150 hectares in accordance with the owner of the case 
farm’s advice. Lastly, the acreage of malting barley is restricted to 25% of the total acreage in 
accordance with the typical crop rotation in south western Skåne (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 
2012).  
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In addition to the above stated restrictions, a number of crop rotation restrictions are 
formulated. This year’s acreage of a crop with a given preceding crop cannot exceed last 
year’s acreage of the preceding crop. Equation 10 is formulated for a crop activity j with the 
preceding crop p.  
𝑥𝑗𝑝 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝, ≠ 𝑗𝑃𝑝=1   ∀   𝑗 = 1 …𝑛  (10) 
The inequality denotes that the hectares of crop j cannot exceed last year’s acreage of the 
preceding crop p. xjp is defined as the number of hectares grown, of crop j with the preceding 
crop p. Moreover, the total acreage of various crops grown after a specific preceding crop 
cannot exceed the total acreage of the preceding crop. This is illustrated by Equation 11. 
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝
𝑛
𝑗=1 ≤ ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝
𝑃
𝑝=1   ∀   𝑗 = 1 …𝑛 , 𝑝 = 1 …𝑃 (11) 
Equations 10 and 11 are used when formulating the restrictions regarding crop rotation, CR, 
in Table 2. 
 4.2.3 Gross Margin Calculations 
In this section the assumptions and calculations of the gross margins are described. The gross 
margin of each crop is evaluated through the use of enterprise budget calculations in 
Agriwise. Agriwise is a software program for agricultural enterprise budget calculations 
developed by SLU and used by agricultural consulting firms and banks in Sweden. This is a 
commonly used method in agriculture as common costs, e.g. maintenance costs and 
depreciation of machinery, often are difficult to allocate to a specific activity (Nilsson et al., 
1983). This is due to that many resources in an agricultural firm can be used within different 
production activities, e.g. the production of different crops. Gross margin (GM) can be 
defined as the contribution of an activity to the coverage of common costs and any possible 
profit. There are different GM measures depending on the share of common costs included in 
the gross margin calculation. The gross margin measure calculated in our study is GM3, 
which is a profit measure used in Agriwise. The Agriwise measure GM3 allocates the largest 
proportion of common costs. See Appendix 5 for an overview of the enterprise budgeting 
method.  
 
The cj-values used in the QRP model equal expected average gross margins per hectare for 
each farm activity j. Enterprise budget calculations have been conducted for all years, 2002-
2011. Some adjustments of the costs estimated in Agriwise were made when calculating the 
gross margins in terms of GM3 in Agriwise. First, the case farm’s actual machinery costs in 
terms of depreciation, maintenance, cultivation system and operating time have been applied 
in the calculations for each crop. This was considered important since the machinery costs of 
Table 2. The table shows the restrictions used in the QRP model. 
  WWpeas WWrape WWmb WWww RAPEmb RAPEpeas MB SB PEAS type RHS 
Acreage 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = 345 
Max WW1)  1 1 1 1      <= 150 
Max RAPE     1 1    <= 57.5 
Max PEAS         1 <= 25.9 
Max SB2)        1  <= 69 
Max MB3)       1   <= 86.3 
CR4) peas 1     1   -1 <= 0 
CR rape  1   -1 -1    <= 0 
1 CR mb   1  1  -1   <= 0 
2 CR mb -1 -1 -1 -1   1 -1  <= 0 
1) Winter wheat, 2) Sugar beets, 3) Malting barley, 4) Crop rotation 
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growing green peas for Findus are substantially lower compared to other crops. The lower 
machinery costs can be explained by non-existing harvesting and transportation costs, less 
application of fertilizer and plant protection and therefore also less operating time. Hence, if 
no adjustments are made, the value of producing peas for Findus is underestimated.  
 
Replacement costs form the basis for the depreciation costs. The machinery is considered to 
have an economic lifetime of 15 years. After this time period, the residual value of the 
machinery is calculated to 20% by using a present value formula stated by Svensson (1988). 
Hence, the depreciation cost is projected to 5.4% by dividing [1 minus the residual value] 
with the economic lifetime of the machinery. The replacement and maintenance costs of the 
case farm’s machinery were mainly estimated by the use of Databoken in Agriwise (www, 
Agriwise, 1, 2012). To adjust 2011 year’s estimated maintenance and depreciation costs for 
the years 2002-2010, a production price index was used (www, Jordbruksverket, 2, 2012). 
Machinery capacity was estimated with the use of the software programme STANK in MIND 
developed by Jordbruksverket. Some minor adjustments to the machinery costs mentioned 
above were made after verifying the estimations with the owner of the case farm. The real net 
user cost of capital used in this study is based on a study by Lagerkvist (1999) and amounts to 
6%. The costs calculated in the enterprise budgets are validated by an acknowledged senior 
agricultural consultant and the person managing Agriwise (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 2012; 
pers. comn., Karlsson, 2012).  
 
Agriwise is not used for calculating the income for each crop and year as yield and output 
price data is not taken from Agriwise. Historical yield data is obtained from the case farm for 
the time period 2002-2011 for all crops except peas, for which data only exists for 2004-2011.  
The income for sugar beets has been calculated by the use of output prices retrieved from 
Agriwise and yield data obtained from the case farm. The output prices used to calculate the 
income for peas are obtained from Findus and refer to the annual average pea price across all 
pea varieties at t-value 100 during the years 2004-2011. The case farm’s actual received pea 
prices are not used in the QRP model because this would prevent us from comparing the 
current pricing model with the alternative pricing models as these are based on the average 
payment for all varieties. Moreover, the case farm has grown different varieties during the 
time period 2004-2011, which further complicates the comparability between years. The 
payment follows a price scheme for different varieties and t-values and the base price is 
calculated for a t-value of 100. Therefore, the average annual pea price across all varieties at 
t-value 100 obtained from Findus, is converted to a pea price consistent with the case farm’s 
actual t-value. By converting the t-values, the pea prices used in the gross margin calculations 
correspond with the case farm’s actual yields.  
 
The output prices used for the remaining crops are limited to cash prices, i.e. spot prices and 
forward prices. To model realistic and up to date pricing strategies used by Swedish farmers, 
it has been assumed that 2/3 of the total harvest of winter wheat, malting barley and rapeseed 
is sold at spot prices and 1/3 is sold at forward prices (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 2012). The 
Swedish producer cooperative Lantmännen offers forward contracts for winter wheat, malting 
barley and rapeseed. These contracts have only been available on the market from November 
2008. Consequently, Lantmännen’s forward prices are used for the years 2009-2011. For the 
remaining years, 2002-2008, modified futures prices from Matif and Liffe are used to 
simulate Lantmännen’s forward prices. The futures prices are modified by deducting a basis 
which is calculated by comparing Lantmännen’s forward prices with the futures prices from 
Matif and Liffe. Thus, an average percentage difference is calculated and deducted from the 
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original futures prices. Lantmännen’s forward prices were obtained from Katarina Gillblad at 
Agronomics and the futures prices were acquired from Lantmännen Cerealia, Malmö.    
 
To make the choice of growing Findus peas comparable to the choice of growing winter 
wheat, malting barley, rapeseed or sugar beets, some assumptions are required. As green peas 
cannot be stored it is assumed in our model that all crops are sold at harvest, i.e. nothing is 
stored at the farm. Hence, the spot prices used are monthly averages during harvest for each 
year during the time period 2002-2011 (www, Jordbruksverket, 1, 2012). Spot prices for 
winter wheat and malting barley refer to average monthly prices for August to October and 
rapeseed prices refer to average monthly prices for September and October. Moreover, we 
assume that the farmer has two alternatives in March: to produce or not produce peas for 
Findus, see Figure 3. The Findus contract, which can be defined as a forward contract, is 
signed in March. To make a rational decision, the farmer needs to be able to enter forward 
contracts for grain at the same point in time as the Findus contract is signed. Thus, forward 
contracts for grain used in our model are entered in March and have an expiry date at harvest, 
i.e. September-November. The futures used in this study are entered in February or March 
and expires at harvest.    
 
The revenues for each crop and year also include farm payments, i.e. subsidy per hectare, 
received from the European Union for cultivated crop areas in the southern part of Skåne 
(www, Agriwise, 2, 2012; pers. comn., Callman, 2012). The change in EU policy regime 
regarding sugar beet production has been taken into consideration. After calculating both 
revenues and costs, the covariance-variance matrix and cj-values used in the QRP model 
could be completed. The calculated cj-values were enumerated to 2011 year’s price level with 
a consumer price index (www, Statistiska centralbyrån, 2012).  
 
4.3 Ethics in Research  
Ethical considerations inevitably arise in research designs where data is collected from people 
(Oliver, 2003). Ethical issues should be considered from the early phases of a research 
project. Typically, the following aspects are discussed concerning ethical guidelines in 
research: informed consent, confidentiality, the role of the researcher and consequences 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Something that is central throughout the whole research project 
is that the researcher should treat participants in a way that help to preserve their dignity 
(Oliver, 2003). In other words, it should be avoided to cause harm, anxiety or distress to 
participants. 
 
To fully inform participants about a research project before they agree to take part is an 
important principle in social research (Oliver, 2003). This is important in order for the 
participant to be in a position to give his/hers fully informed consent. The potential 
participants in the survey were through the introduction letter carefully informed about the 
purpose of the project and the main features of the research design. Moreover, it was clarified 
that the producers were asked to participate on a voluntarily basis and that they had the right 
to withdraw from the project at any time. The producers that agreed to participate in the 
survey were given further information if they had questions, but no actual questions or 
statements were given out in advance. Another central ethical principle in research is that the 
participant should be offered anonymity in a research report (Oliver, 2003). Put differently, 
private data identifying the respondents should not be disclosed (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
All respondents in the telephone survey were guaranteed that their personal data were not to 
be disclosed, i.e. all interviewees were to be treated confidentially. Similarly, anonymity in 
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the written report was guaranteed to all participants. Moreover, the case farm is treated 
anonymously in accordance with the ethical considerations presented above.  
 
The consequences of a research project need to be considered with respect to the participants, 
including possible harm to the participants (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). “Perhaps the key 
issue is that in order to place research on a firm moral footing, there should at least be the 
intent to improve the human condition” (Oliver, 2003, p. 12). The aim of our project is to 
examine if there are alterative pricing models, which imply that both contract parties are 
better off compared to the current pricing model. Our intention is therefore to examine if the 
pea producers’ and Findus’ contract situation can be improved. The role of the researcher is 
fundamental to the ethical aspects of a research project (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). This 
involves the researcher’s integrity and the researcher’s sensitivity to moral issues. For 
instance, the role of the researcher is important in how data are interpreted and presented as 
there are number of ways in which data can be interpreted. Thus, the researcher should 
indicate that there are alternatives in terms of how data are interpreted to avoid that an 
inexperienced reader assumes that the data can only be analyzed in one way.  
 
4.4 Alternative Pricing Models 
The pricing models that are examined are the pricing model in the current contract, deferred 
pricing and window pricing. The pricing models formulated should be viewed as rough 
schematic models rather than exact pricing models.   
4.4.1 Deferred Pricing  
Deferred pricing is common in production contracts and the price in such a contract is often 
based on a cash or futures price that is observed at a later point in time (Heifner et. al., 1993). 
As there is no spot market for green peas, the deferred pricing formula used in this report 
cannot be linked to a spot or futures price for green peas. Instead of growing peas, the Findus 
pea producers can choose to produce other crops in the crop rotation. Hence, the pea price has 
been designed as a formula consisting of spot and forward prices for winter wheat, malting 
barley and rapeseed according to the following equation: 
𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 0.25 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 0.25 ∗ 𝑀𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 0.3238 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  (12) 
The spot and forward prices used in the price formula are the same prices as those used in the 
calculations of gross margins for each crop and year. Only commodities for which it is 
possible to retrieve market prices and that are grown on the case farm, are included in the 
price formula. Hence, the commodities included in the formula are winter wheat, malting 
barley and rapeseed. There is no open market price for sugar beets as sugar beet production is 
regulated by a quota system. The weights for each price presented in Equation 12 are 
calculated by solving the formula iteratively in Excel. The price formula is determined so that 
it complies with two notions. First, the deferred price should decrease the uncertainty of the 
relative value of producing peas in collaboration with Findus in comparison to the value of 
producing other crops during the years 2004-2011. Accordingly, the deferred price should 
have a higher correlation with the upward and downward movements in grain prices under the 
same time period. Second, the price formula should be designed in a way so that the average 
price during the years 2004-2011 under the deferred pricing model is equal to the average 
price under the current pricing model. The price under the current pricing model refers to the 
average annual price in öre/kg across all pea varieties at t-value 100. Hence, the pea price in 
the deferred pricing model also refers to an average price across all varieties. An average 
deferred price equivalent to the current average price is considered satisfactory as Findus 
today has a sufficient number of contracted pea producers. Thus it can be assumed that the 
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current pea price is accepted by the pea producers. The weights assigned to each commodity 
in the formula are estimated in order to comply with the above stated concepts.  
 
4.4.2 Window Pricing  
Two window pricing models are formulated in this study. As the literature on window 
contracts, the window pricing models in this report are formulated with a secure minimum 
price floor and a maximum ceiling price (Unterschultz et. al., 1998). The reference market 
price that gives the window price are in our models based on spot and forward prices for 
winter wheat, malting barley and rapeseed as there is no spot price for green peas (Shao & 
Roe, 2003). However, the concept is the same in terms of that the Findus pea producers 
remove risk below the window floor in exchange for giving up gains above the window 
ceiling (Unterschultz et. al., 1998). Both window pricing models can be defined as fixed-
window contracts (Shao & Roe, 2003). Moving-window contracts have not been used in this 
study as the input prices in green pea production are assumed to be rather stable.      
 
The window 1 pricing model is a development of the deferred pricing model as the price 
formula used in the deferred pricing model is applied in the window 1 pricing model. In 
addition to the formula, a floor price is introduced in the equation. The floor price equals the 
estimated breakeven price for green pea production. The breakeven price equals the average 
production cost of 4300 SEK per hectare calculated in the enterprise budget for Findus peas. 
Moreover, a ceiling price of 8700 SEK per hectare is inserted into the price formula. The 
ceiling price is set so that the average payment per hectare received by Findus producers 
during the years 2000-2011 becomes the symmetrical center around the floor and ceiling 
price. The price formula can be expressed in the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/ℎ𝑎 = 4300 +  �(0.25 ∗ 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 0.25 ∗ 𝑀𝐵𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 0.3238 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗0.476� ∗ 𝑘𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑠/ℎ𝑎 ≤ 8700     (13) 
According to the formula, the minimum payment per hectare becomes effective when the 
hectare payment falls below 4300 SEK and the maximum payment becomes effective when 
the payment exceeds 8700 SEK per hectare. This enables the farmer a secure payment ranging 
from 4300-8700 SEK per hectare. Similarly to Equation 12, the weights for each price 
presented in Equation 13 are calculated by solving the formula iteratively in Excel so that it 
complies with earlier mentioned notions, see section 4.4.1. As a floor price is introduced, it is 
reasonable that the price per kg above 4300 SEK per hectare is lower compared to Equation 
12. Thus, the weight 0.476 is introduced. 
  
The window 2 pricing model is based on the current pricing model. Hence, the average annual 
price in öre/kg across all pea varieties at t-value 100 is used in window pricing model 2. As in 
the other pricing models, the pea prices are adjusted to the case farm’s actual t-value for each 
year. Moreover, the floor price and ceiling price used in the window 1 pricing model are 
applied. Hence, the pea producers are guaranteed a minimum payment of 4300 SEK per 
hectare but cannot receive more than 8700 SEK per hectare.  
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5 Results  
In this chapter the results of the telephone survey and quadratic risk programming model are 
presented. In addition, the Findus pea producers’ overall degree of risk aversion is estimated.   
 
5.1 Survey 
The average respondent of the conducted telephone survey is a 51.5 year old man that farms 
280 hectares in total. On average, the interviewed pea producers grow peas on 7.5% of their 
total cultivated acreage and the average producer has grown peas for Findus during six of the 
last ten years.  
 
5.1.1 Risk Attitude  
Statements 7-15 in the survey, aim to measure the risk attitudes of Findus pea producers. The 
statements are evaluated by calculating scale-means and standard deviations for all 
statements, see Table 3 for an overview of the results.  
 
The participants’ degree of market orientation is measured by two statements. The first one 
referring to if the producers perceive themselves to be updated about the market prices of the 
products they produce. When summarizing the answers the scale-mean is 4.16, on the used 
five degree scale, and the standard deviation is calculated to 1.1. The second statement claims 
that the farmers adapt to changes in the grain market. This statement generated a scale-mean 
of 3.68 and a standard deviation of 0.97. Combining these two items give an overall score of 
market orientation of 3.92 on a five degree scale, where 1 indicates low market orientation 
and 5 indicates a high degree of market orientation.   
 
The pea producers’ risk preferences are also tested by using two statements. The scale-mean 
of the statement “I consider the grain market as risky” is 3.33 and the standard deviation 
sums up to 1.12. The other statement claims that the producer is able to predict grain prices 
and resulted in a scale-mean of 2.16 and a standard deviation of 0.93. Combining items 9 and 
10 give an overall score of risk preference of 3.62 on a five degree scale, where 1 indicates a 
low perception of risk and 5 indicates a high perception of risk. Hence, the respondents 
estimate that the degree of risk inherent in selling grain is relatively high as the average sum 
of the two items is above 3. 
 
The degree of innovativeness is measured by two statements in the questionnaire. The first 
one claiming that the respondent buys new products before his colleagues. The scale-mean on 
this statement is 2.69 and the standard deviation 1.12. The second statement, “I like 
experimenting with new ways of doing things in my enterprise” results in a scale-mean of 3.38 
and a standard deviation of 1.11. Combining these two items give an overall score of 
innovativeness of 3.04 on a five degree scale, where 1 indicates low innovativeness and 5 
indicates a high degree of innovativeness. 
 
The last construct, risk attitude scale is in this study measured by three questions. “I am more 
concerned about making a large loss than to forgo a significant profit” gives a scale-mean of 
3.31 and a standard deviation of 0.86. The next statement claims that the respondent would 
rather be safe than sorry, and gives a scale-mean of 3.43 with a standard deviation of 0.95. 
The scale-mean of the statement “I am willing to take higher financial risks when selling my 
grain, in order to realize higher average yields” is 3.14 and the standard deviation is 0.98. 
Combining items 13, 14, and 15 give an overall score of risk attitude of 2.80 on a five degree 
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scale, where 1 indicates a low degree of risk aversion and 5 indicates a high degree of risk 
aversion.  
 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation for questions 7-15. 
Question Mean Standard deviation 
7 4.16 1.1 
8 3.68 0.97 
9 3.33 1.12 
10 2.16 0.93 
11 2.69 1.12 
12 3.38 1.11 
13 3.31 0.86 
14 3.43 0.95 
15 3.14 0.98 
 
5.1.2 The Pea Producers’ Motivation for Growing Findus Peas 
The result of statements 16-19 seek to reveal the interviewed pea producers’ motivation for 
producing peas. The motivation is studied by asking the respondent to indicate on a five 
degree scale the extent to which he/she perceives the economic value of producing peas in 
comparison to alternative crops as high. The alternative crops are rapeseed, winter wheat, 
malting barley and sugar beets. The result is presented in Table 4 below. The table shows that 
the respondents consider the value of producing sugar beets and rapeseed to exceed the value 
of growing peas. The value of producing malting barley is comparable to the value of growing 
peas whilst the value of growing winter wheat is somewhat lower than the value of producing 
peas.  
 
Table 4. Findus pea producers’ opinion about the economic value of growing Findus peas in comparison to other 
crops. A score below 3 indicates that the alternative crop is considered more profitable than peas.  
 Rapeseed Winter wheat Malting barley Sugar beets 
Average 2.51 3.38 3 2.14 
Standard deviation 1.04 0.99 0.91 1.01 
 
The last set of statements, 20-23 seek to give an indication about how the pea producers 
perceive the present contract design, the current pricing model and their attitude towards some 
possible changes, see Table 5 for an overview. This is examined with four statements in the 
survey. The first one stating “I am satisfied with the financial compensation I receive from 
Findus for producing peas” resulting in a scale-mean of 2.49 and a standard deviation of 
1.08. The next statement claim that the respondent prefers that the pea price is specified when 
the contract is signed. This statement results in an average score of 3.94 and a standard 
deviation of 0.98. The third one states that the producer would prefer that the pea price 
follows grain prices to a greater extent. When summarizing the answers, the scale-mean sums 
up to 2.94 and the standard deviation to 1.28. The fourth and last statement in the survey, “I 
am willing to take higher financial risks when producing peas, in order to realize higher 
average yields” gives a scale-mean of 2.87 and a standard deviation of 1.07.  
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Table 5. Mean and standard deviation for questions 26-29. 
Question Mean Standard deviation 
20 2.49 1.08 
21 3.94 0.98 
22 2.94 1.28 
23 2.87 1.07 
 
In question number 24, the respondents are asked to rank three identified benefits of 
producing Findus peas, starting with the most important one. The most common ranking 
(52%) is the following sequence:  
 
1. Preceding crop benefits and crop rotation 
2. Easy crop to grow as it results in a reduced work load, etc.  
3. Economically beneficial crop 
 
Hence, preceding crop benefits and crop rotation is considered to be the greatest benefit of 
growing Findus peas. Finally, the participants are asked if there is anything in the pea 
production contract that they would like to change. 8 respondents or 13% state that they 
receive their payment too late, instead they would prefer if the payment is made no later than 
30 days after harvest. About 11% of the respondents report that a major drawback of 
producing peas for Findus is soil compaction caused by combines at wet weather conditions 
during the harvest period. The producers also state that they would prefer economic 
compensation when these damages occur. 6 participants state that the pea price should 
correlate with grain prices to a greater extent. Several producers (6 respondents) are 
dissatisfied by the fact that they always plant late as this increases the production risk due to 
higher risk of drought. A proposed solution is to rotate the planting time among the pea 
producers. About 5% of the interviewed farmers indicate that they believe that quantity, in 
terms of yield, is more profitable than producing peas of high quality, i.e. t-values above 100 
are more economically advantageous than t-values below 100. Some farmers state that the 
minimum payment should be increased and that pea production is not profitable for the years 
when a minimum payment is received.  
  
5.1.3 Risk Attitude of the Findus Pea Producers  
The results of the telephone survey show that the respondents’ overall degree of risk aversion 
is not extremely low nor extremely high. The farmers are market orientated, they do not 
perceive the grain market as extremely risky, they like experimenting with new ways of doing 
things in their enterprises and they are willing to take on a higher degree of risk if offered 
financial compensation. However, the survey result indicates that the respondents are unable 
to predict prices in the grain market and that they do not invest in new products before their 
colleagues do it. Moreover, they are more concerned about making a large loss than to forgo a 
significant profit and they make decisions in accordance with the expression “I would rather 
be safe than sorry”.  
 
Based on the survey results and the study by Pennings (2004), the Findus pea producers are 
considered to be relatively risk averse. In accordance with the classification made by 
Hardaker et. al., (1997) the pea producers’ coefficient of relative risk aversion is then 2.0. 
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5.2 Quadratic Risk Programming Model 
In this section the result of the QRP model is presented. First, the case farm’s optimal farm 
plan given the current pricing model is described. Second, the result of the optimization 
model when applying the alternative pricing models, i.e. deferred pricing, window pricing 1 
and window pricing 2, is presented. The overall result of the QRP model is illustrated in 
Figure 9 and depicts the efficient frontiers and the tangent for each pricing model, see section 
3.3. The case farm’s expected net farm income and coefficient of variation (CV) are 
calculated for each model given the assumptions made in section 6.2. The CV is calculated as 
the standard deviation divided by the expected income and indicates the riskiness of the 
expected income (Sterte, 2011). The CV measure enables comparison between data with 
different magnitudes. Lastly, the case farm’s change in expected net farm income when not 
producing peas is compared to the situation when peas are produced, for each pricing model.  
5.2.1 Current Pricing Model 
In Table 6, the case farm’s average income, cost and gross margin per hectare for each crop 
during the time period 2002-2011 is presented. Income minus cost gives GM3 for each crop. 
GM3 is the measure used in the QRP model. However, GM1, see Appendix 5, is also included 
in the table as this measure is commonly used by farmers and agricultural consultants (pers. 
comn., Yngvesson, 2012). An example of the enterprise budgets formulated is presented in 
Appendix 6. The appendix contains the enterprise budgets for Findus peas and winter wheat 
preceded by rapeseed for 2011. Note that the GM3 values in Appendix 6 do not correspond to 
the GM3 values in Table 6 as the values in Table 6 are average gross margins for all years. 
Sugar beets is undoubtedly the crop in the case farm’s crop rotation with the highest average 
income, costs and gross margin. The second most profitable crop is peas grown on contract 
for Findus and the third most profitable crop is rapeseed planted after malting barley. Note 
that peas are the second most profitable crop in spite of the fact that the income per hectare is 
the lowest of all crops. Rapeseed preceded by malting barley is more profitable than rapeseed 
planted after peas although the cost of nitrogen is lower for the latter farm activity as the 
preceding benefit is by far higher for malting barley, see Table 1. Winter wheat preceded by 
peas is the most profitable winter wheat crop alternative as the cost of nitrogen is reduced 
whilst the yield is increased. The other winter wheat activities have the following sequence in 
terms of gross margin: WWrape, WWmb and lastly WWww. The profitability of malting barley 
is equivalent to WWpeas, WWrape and RAPEmb but higher for the other activities for winter 
wheat and rapeseed.   
The pea producers’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ra(Y)) is estimated to 0.000001 by 
the use of Equation 8. By the use of the estimated ra(Y), the case farm’s optimal farm plan is 
derived. The case farm’s optimal farm plan given the current pricing model is illustrated in 
Table 7. The farm activities SB, PEAS, RAPEmb, WWpeas, MB and WWrape are maximized in 
terms of the restrictions shown in Table 2. Except for the above mentioned activities, it is 
Table 6. Average income, cost and gross margins per hectare (SEK), GM1 and GM3, for the years 2002-2011 calculated for 
the crops in the crop rotation system given possible preceding crop benefits. All numbers in 2011 year’s price level.   
 WWpeas WWrape WWmb WWww RAPEmb RAPEpeas MB SB PEAS 
Income 14299 14433 13357 12954 13324 11953 11910 24815 10832 
Costs 10618 10795 10795 10795 9587 8981 8254 13 739 4248 
GM3 3680 3638 2562 2159 3737 2971 3656 11076 6584 
GM1 7880 7843 6767 6363 7462 6656 7163 16193 9131 
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optimal to grow 23.0 hectares of WWmb. Thus, the crop rotation consists of 30.8% winter 
wheat, 16.7% rapeseed, 25.0% malting barley, 20.0% sugar beets and 7.5% Findus peas.    
5.2.2 Alternative Pricing Models 
The case farm’s optimal farm plan is identical in all pricing models, see Table 7. In Figure 9, 
the efficient frontier and the tangent for each pricing model is graphically derived.  According 
to Figure 9, the current pricing model is the model that results in the lowest standard 
deviation i.e. the lowest risk, and is therefore graphed to the left of all other alternatives. The 
deferred pricing model is the alternative that gives the highest standard deviation and also the 
highest expected net farm income of the four alternatives. As shown in Figure 9, the pea 
producers’ degree of risk aversion is of minor importance as the slopes of the efficient 
frontiers are so steep in relation to the slopes of the tangents. A small decrease in standard 
deviation, results in a large decrease in expected net farm income.  
 
Figure 9. Efficient frontiers and tangents for the different pricing models; Current contract, Deferred pricing 
model, Window pricing model 1 and Window pricing model 2. Source: own modification. 
Table 8 shows the case farm’s expected net farm income, coefficient of variation (CV) of the 
expected net farm income, the expected utility for each pricing model and the case farm’s 
change in expected net farm income when not producing peas compared to the situation when 
peas are produced. Which is already shown in Figure 9, the deferred pricing model is the 
pricing model with the highest expected net farm income and the highest risk in terms of 
variation in expected net farm income. However, given the Findus pea producers’ degree of 
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Table 7. Combinations of crops that give highest expected return when considering the farmer’s degree of risk aversion. 
 WWpeas WWrape WWmb WWww RAPEmb RAPEpeas MB SB PEAS 
Hectare 25.9 57.5 23.0 0.0 57.5 0.0 86.3 69.0 25.9 
Percentage 7.5% 16.7% 6.6%  16.7%  25.0% 20.0% 7.5% 
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risk aversion, the current pricing model yields the highest expected utility. Nevertheless, the 
differences in expected net farm income, CV and expected utility between the pricing models 
are quite small. As the pea producers’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ra(Y)) is so small 
and thus has a small impact on the optimal solution, the expected utility measure (E(U)) for 
the various pricing models is only somewhat lower compared to the E(π) measure. When 
Findus peas is excluded from the case farm’s crop rotation, the expected net farm income 
decreases for all pricing models with between 129 520 and 152 092 SEK. This equals a loss in 
expected net farm income of 375 to 441 SEK per hectare given the case farm’s total acreage.  
 
As shown by Table 8, the alternative pricing models do not reduce the case farm’s overall 
risk, instead the overall risk increases compared to the current contract situation when the 
alternative pricing models are introduced. However, when examining the case farm’s risk 
exposure associated only with historical gross margins per hectare of Findus peas, the CV 
values of the alternative pricing models are lower than the CV value of the current pricing 
model, see Table 9. The window 2 pricing model, which is based on the same price as the 
current pricing model, has the lowest CV value, followed by the deferred pricing model, the 
window 1 pricing model and lastly the current pricing model.   
 
Table 9. Coefficient of variation and GM3 for the four different pricing models per hectare. 
 Current Deferred Window 1 Window 2 
CV 31.1% 25.1% 29.2% 24.2% 
GM3 6584 6605 5732 6124 
 
This is due to that the pea price of the current pricing model does not correlate with grain 
prices to the same extent as the pea price in the alternative pricing models. When relating the 
pea price to grain prices, the total variance of the case farm’s expected net farm income 
increases, which implies an increase in the overall risk exposure. That the CV value of the 
window 2 model is the lowest can be explained by the fact that the variance in the pea price 
decreases as the ceiling price becomes effective. As shown by Table 9, the deferred pricing 
model gives the highest expected gross margin per hectare of peas followed by the current 
pricing model, the window 2 pricing model and lastly the window 1 pricing model. The lower 
gross margins of the window pricing models can be explained by that the window ceiling 
becomes effective due to the case farm’s high yields.   
 
 
Table 8. The pricing models effect on the case farm’s net farm income (SEK) and expected utility.  
 Current Deferred Window 1 Window 2 
E(π) 1 828 163 1 828 696 1 806 124 1 816 267 
CV(E(π)) 33.5% 35.5% 34.5% 34.4% 
E(U) 1809438 1807622 1786739 1796737 
E(π)-E(π) No peas 151 559 152 092 129 520 139 663 
E(π)-E(π) No peas/ha 439 441 375 405 
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6 Analysis and discussion 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the results of the telephone survey and the QRP model 
presented in chapter 5 in relation to the Literature review and the Theoretical framework. The 
headings in this chapter are based on the research questions stated in the Introduction. The 
generalizability of the results of the QRP model is also discussed.  
 
Our contribution to research is that we study a contract crop in relation to alternative crops in 
the crop rotation. Hence, in a decision making context, combinations of crop activities can be 
viewed as different portfolios, i.e. farm plans. Marketing strategies for one crop activity can 
therefore not be assessed in isolation from marketing strategies for alternative crops; instead 
an overall farm-level analysis for evaluating a contract crop is conducted. 
 
6.1 How Do the Current Contract and Pricing Model Function?  
The current production contract between Findus and its pea producers’ is to a great extent 
formulated similarly to the Danisco Foods pea production contract described by Bogetoft & 
Ballebye Olesen (2002; 2004). In accordance with the literature, the Findus pea production 
contract is formulated in a way that ensures a highly centralized decision making structure, 
which is the classical design of production contracts (Bijman, 2008). Centralized decision 
making is necessary in green pea production as the harvest must be highly synchronized since 
green peas for human consumption are highly perishable. Moreover, Findus contracts about 
500 pea producers each year which makes accurate planning crucial. Thus, coordination of 
planting time and choice of pea variety is essential in order to synchronize the harvest to 
match the capacity of the combines and the plant in Bjuv.  
 
Findus offers only one contract and one price scheme to all producers, which minimizes the 
transaction costs (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). This implies that Findus must offer a 
price above the reservation value of some growers to attract a sufficient number of producers. 
The intention of the price scheme in the Findus contract is to ensure that an individual 
producer receives the same average payment per hectare regardless of variety. This setup 
ensures that the farmer is equally well off regardless of variety. However, high yielding 
farmers receive a higher payment per hectare, as their yield per hectare is higher, compared to 
low yielding farmers. Compared to the Dansico Foods pricing model described in chapter 2, 
the pricing model in the current Findus contract has a different setup. The payment to an 
individual Danisco farmer was less dependent on yield as the average payment to the Danisco 
farmers was the same in all groups. Thus, high yielding Danisco farmers could be perceived 
as negatively discriminated and low yielding farmers may be regarded as positively 
discriminated. As a result, the highest yielding Dansico pea producers did not obtain their 
reservation values. This is not the case in the Findus contract as the farmers are paid in 
accordance with their performance in absolute terms, rather than in relative terms. Hence, the 
payment is based on the individual farmer’s output regardless of the output of others. The 
Findus contract therefore creates incentives for high yielding farmers to enter the Findus 
contract and all farmers are motivated to maximize their yield and therefore the integrated 
profit.  
  
In contract design it is important to motivate both parties to act so that the integrated profit is 
maximized (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). The contract must provide both parties with 
profits or utilities at least equal to what the parties could obtain if not entering the contract, 
i.e. their reservation values. The results in Table 6 show that Findus peas is the second most 
profitable crop in the crop rotation after sugar beets. On the contrary to the pricing model of 
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the Danisco Foods contract, high yielding Findus producers may receive a payment that 
exceeds their reservation value. According to the results of our QRP model, the case farm’s 
gross margin for Findus peas is higher than for most other crop activities. The case farm’s 
reservation value can be defined as the profit from the farm’s best alternative option (Bogetoft 
& Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Rapeseed and malting barley are the alternative crops to peas as 
these three crops are the only preceding alternatives to winter wheat. In accordance with 
literature, the case farm’s reservation value for peas can be defined as the highest gross 
margin for rapeseed and malting barley. Hence, the case farm’s reservation value is 3737 
SEK, see Table 6. Consequently, the case farm obtains a payment from Findus higher than the 
farm’s reservation value. This may be due to that the case farm has a low cost structure, better 
soil and growing conditions and/or that the case farm is characterized by a higher level of 
managerial skills (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004).  
 
The case farm’s cost structure is typical and a production cost of 4300 SEK per hectare for 
Findus peas is regarded as a reasonable average production cost (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 
2012). Our case farm is situated in a region characterized by very good soils and growing 
conditions compared to the rest of the Findus pea production area. A comparison of the case 
farm’s historical average yields for a ten year period with historical average standard yields in 
the same region, i.e. SCB’s yield survey district 1211, has been conducted (Statistiska 
centralbyrån, 2011). The comparison was made for all crops in the case farm’s crop rotation 
except for Findus peas as this data is not available. The comparison between the case farm 
and yield survey district 1211 shows that the case farm’s average yields are considerably 
higher for rapeseed and sugar beets and comparable to winter wheat and malting barley, see 
Table 10. Consequently, the case farm is considered to be characterized by a higher level of 
managerial skills and/or facing more favorable climate and soil conditions than farmers in his 
region. In respect to the above reasoning, the case farm has a high reservation value compared 
to the average Findus pea producer and it is explained by the case farm’s good soil and 
managerial skills and thus high yields. The high reservation value can however not be 
explained by a low cost structure as the case farm’s cost structure is average. In spite of the 
case farm’s high reservation value, the gross margin for peas exceeds the gross margins of 
winter wheat, malting barley and rapeseed.  
Findus strives to maximize the length of the harvesting period, which may lead to a conflict of 
interest between Findus and the farmers (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Thus, some 
famers have to plant at a point in time which is not agronomically optimal. In general, it can 
be said that the same variety is planted in the same geographical region (pers. comn., Nilsson, 
J, 2012). Therefore, it can be assumed that farmers in some areas tend to plant early and 
farmers in other areas tend to plant late. Some participants in the telephone survey state that 
they are dissatisfied as they each year tend to be assigned to plant late, which they think has a 
negative impact on their yield as the risk of drought at a late planting time is increased. 
However, as an individual farmer should be indifferent between the choice of variety, the loss 
caused by planting at a less favorable time is shared between all farmers (Bogetoft & 
Ballebye Olesen, 2004). In addition, fields that are harvested late receive an additional 
payment which further compensates these farmers. Whether the farmers that have to plant late 
Table 10. The table shows the case farm’s average yields in relation to the average yields of yield survey district 
1211. 
 Winter wheat Malting barley Rapeseed Sugar beets 
Case farm 8888 6506 3679 54893 
1211 8846 6567 3319 51715 
% Difference 0.48% -0.94% 9.79% 5.79% 
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are completely compensated or not is not examined in this study. As the farmers cannot affect 
at what t-value their peas are harvested, it is important that the price scheme for each variety 
is formulated so that the t-value has no effect on their payment per hectare. Nevertheless, 
some respondents in the survey indicate that t-values above 100 are more profitable than t-
values beneath 100.  
 
Our survey results indicate that the Findus pea producers are rather content with how the 
contract and pricing model are formulated. The survey result shows that the majority of the 
respondents prefer a predetermined pea price. In addition, the participants are slightly 
negative towards a pea price that to a greater extent is linked to grain prices. However, the pea 
producers’ opinions of a pea price with a higher correlation to grain prices are uncertain and 
of low quality as the standard deviation for this statement is relatively high. A majority of the 
respondents indicate that they are not willing to take higher risks when producing peas, in 
order to realize a higher average payment. No questions or statements regarding alternative 
pricing models were included in the survey as it was assumed that those types of questions 
would be difficult to answer. It is difficult to relate to something that is unknown and it was 
considered that the pea producers therefore would not be able to have any opinions about 
alternative pricing models.  
 
As the payment to the pea producers is independent of Findus’ marketing possibilities to its 
customers, Findus bears all price risk (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Moreover, the 
production contract determines an exact price to be paid (Heifner et. al., 1993; Harwood et. 
al., 1999). It can be assumed that Findus is the cheapest risk bearer in comparison to the 
Findus pea producers (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2004). Hence, the contract should be 
designed in such a way that Findus assumes all risk except some element of the idiosyncratic 
risk as some risk must be borne by the farmers for incentive reasons. The Findus producers 
bear some idiosyncratic risk as their yield and thus payment is dependent on that the farmers 
perform plant protection etc. The general production risk in pea production is shared between 
the farmer and Findus. From the starting point of harvest, Findus takes all production risk as 
the payment to the farmers is independent on whether the processor can market the peas as 
green peas for human consumption or not.  
 
The Findus pea producers are exposed to a relatively large share of the general production risk 
in the current contract as the farmers are paid in accordance with their performance in 
absolute terms, rather than in relative terms (Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen, 2002). Findus bears 
some general production risk as the farmers are guaranteed a minimum payment of 58% of 
the average yearly payment. However, as the minimum payment is dependent on average 
payment and thus average yield, the pea producers are not completely protected against 
general production risk at very low yields. When comparing the annual historical average 
payments per hectare for all pea producers across all varieties with our calculated production 
cost, it is evident that the minimum payment is less than the production cost for some years. 
The results of our survey reveal that some respondents want the minimum payment to be 
increased. The pea producers’ general production risk would be eliminated at very low yields 
if the minimum payment was fixed, i.e. independent of average yield. If risk is shifted from 
one contract party to the other party, the latter requires a larger share of the risk premium 
(Meuwissen et. al., 2001; Hedberg, 1996; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Hence, if Findus bears 
a larger share of the general production risk, the farmers must accept a lower expected profit. 
If the pea producers are guaranteed a minimum payment per hectare at very low yields, it is 
reasonable that the farmers refrain some profit at very high yields. This may be achieved by 
introducing a maximum payment per hectare. 
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6.2 How Do the Pricing Models Affect the Pea Producers’ Risk 
and Return?  
The optimal farm plan is identical in all pricing models. Thus, regardless of pricing model it is 
optimal to maximize the number of hectares of sugar beets, peas, rapeseed preceded by 
malting barley, winter wheat preceded by peas, malting barley and winter wheat preceded by 
rapeseed. The restrictions in Table 2 make the optimal solution stable as the options between 
different farm activities are limited. According to the QRP model, the differences between the 
examined pricing models are very small both in terms of expected net farm income, expected 
farm utility and risk. This was expected as the pricing models were formulated so that the 
average payment across all varieties and pea producers for a t-value of 100 were the same for 
all pricing models.  
The deferred pricing model’s expected net farm income is 533 SEK higher than the expected 
net farm income of the current pricing model, see Table 8. Conversely, if risk is taken into 
account the current pricing model is preferable as it has the highest expected farm utility. The 
window 2 pricing model is according to the optimization model the third most beneficial 
alternative and preferred over the window 1 pricing model. The case farm’s payment hits the 
ceiling price twice in the window 1 pricing model and three times in the window 2 pricing 
model; the floor price never becomes effective. As the ceiling price is effective, the average 
gross margin or cj-value per hectare is decreased, see Table 9. Thus, as shown in Table 8 the 
expected net farm income and utility are somewhat lower for the window pricing models 
compared to the current pricing model and the deferred pricing model. As a result, the case 
farm would not benefit if a window pricing model was introduced. This is due to the fact that 
the case farm’s yields for peas are high. However, if the case farm would have had average or 
low yields in relation to the average yield across the entire Findus pea production area, the 
pricing models’ effect on the case farm’s risk and return would have been different. A 
window pricing model is preferable for pea producers with low average yields as the floor 
price would kick in and increase their expected net farm income. 
The concept of window pricing is to remove risk below the window floor in exchange for 
giving up gains above the window ceiling (Unterschultz et. al., 1998). This is achieved in the 
window 1 and window 2 pricing models. However, as the Findus pea price in the window 1 
pricing model is related to grain prices, the overall risk of the optimal farm plan increases. 
Also when applying the window 2 pricing model, the overall risk of the optimal farm plan 
increases. This is due to that the ceiling price in the window 2 pricing model is effective 
during years when grain prices are low. Thus, the covariances between grain prices and the 
gross margins for Findus peas are increased compared to the current pricing model and thus 
the CV value increases, see Appendix 1 and Table 8. Hence, the risk and therefore the 
variance in the total expected net farm income increases. The formulation of the window 
pricing models should be considered as rough schematic models and an alternative 
formulation would impact the result. An alternative would be to link the pea price to annual 
averages of spot and forward prices for grain instead of average prices at harvest.  
 
Figure 10 illustrates in accordance with Bogetoft & Ballebye Olesen (2004) the general 
production risk in the deferred pricing model and the window pricing models. The deferred 
pricing model can in this figure be compared to the current pricing model. In the deferred 
pricing model, the pea producers’ minimum payment is not specified in monetary units. On 
the other hand, there is no upper limit for the hectare payment. Conversely, in the window 
pricing models the producers’ are guaranteed a fixed floor price or minimum payment whilst 
there is a maximum payment per hectare.    
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Figure 10. The pricing and general production risk of the alternative pricing models. Source: own modification. 
 
It can be proposed that the current pricing model should be retained as the pea producers are 
relatively content with the current pricing model. In the current pricing model, the pea price is 
not linked to grain prices, which can be seen as both an advantage and a disadvantage. The 
current pricing model is favorable in terms of risk as the variance of the expected net farm 
income is minimized. An uncoupled pea price may be very advantageous for years when 
grain prices fall during the growing season. On the other hand, an uncoupled pea price may be 
a disadvantage for years when grain prices increase during the growing season. In this case, 
the received pea price may be a disappointment. It may be psychologically important for the 
pea producers to use a pricing model with a price more correlated with grain prices. If grain 
prices increase in relation to the pea price during the growing season the profitability of 
growing peas may be lower than the profitability of alternative crops. In this case, the 
farmers’ reservation values are not obtained. Though, it may be disadvantageous for Findus to 
introduce a pricing model with a pea price correlating with grain prices to a greater extent 
than in the current pricing model. The grain market and the market for frozen vegetables are 
two completely separate markets in terms of price movements, supply and demand. Hence, it 
is difficult for Findus to transfer its increased costs associated with increased grain prices and 
thus the pea price to its customers.  
 
It may be advantageous for Findus to introduce a window pricing model with a maximum 
payment per hectare, i.e. a ceiling price per hectare, regardless of t-value. This would imply 
that the total maximum payment for all producers is known and fixed. Findus is at present 
owned by the British private equity firm Lion Capital. Creation of shareholder value is 
increasingly being used as a yardstick of performance in large companies (Srivastava et al., 
1998). Shareholder value can be defined as the present value of future cash flows discounted 
by the risk-adjusted cost of capital. One way of increasing shareholder value is to reduce the 
risk associated with cash flows as a reduction in volatility of cash flows indirectly decreases 
the firm’s cost of capital. Hence, more stable cash flows cause higher net present values and 
thus more shareholder value (Pennings, 2004). A window pricing model can be considered to 
result in more stable cash flows as the total payment cannot exceed the ceiling price per 
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hectare times the number of producers. One the other hand, a window contract also implies 
the use of a price floor that transfers some of the production risk from the pea producers to 
Findus. Hence, if introducing a window contract Findus has to increase their total payments to 
their pea producers compared to the payment in the current contract during years when the 
pea production amongst all pea producers is low. On the contrary, years when the overall 
production amongst Findus pea producers is high, Findus will lower their total payment 
compared to what they would pay if using the pricing model in the current contract. 
Introducing a window pricing model therefore implies a reduction of price risk because of the 
fixed maximum payment but an increase in total payment relative to the payment in the 
current contract during years when the average yield is low amongst a large part of the Findus 
pea producers.   
 
6.3 What is the Value of Incorporating Findus Peas in the Crop 
Rotation?  
The results in Table 6 show that the value of growing peas for Findus is considerably more 
profitable than producing rapeseed and malting barley. Nevertheless, both the survey results 
and the optimization results indicate that sugar beets is the most profitable crop in the case 
farm’s crop rotation system. The difference in gross margin between RAPEmb and RAPEpeas 
can be explained by the difference in preceding crop benefit, see Table 1. Even though the 
costs of nitrogen are lower for RAPEpeas, the yield is so much lower that the gross margin 
cannot compete with the gross margin for RAPEmb. The costs of WWpeas are slightly lower 
than the costs of the other winter wheat activities as the nitrogen costs are somewhat lower. 
Despite that the yield and thus income is higher for WWrape, the gross margin for WWpeas 
exceeds the gross margin for WWrape. It is noticeable that peas grown on contract for Findus is 
the case farm’s second most profitable crop after sugar beets, see Table 6. This can be 
explained by the fact that the costs of producing peas are low in comparison to the alternative 
crops. Pea production for Findus is associated with less working capital costs as costs for 
seed, harvest and fertilizers are eliminated or reduced. The machinery costs and thus 
maintenance and depreciation costs are substantially lower for peas as pea production for 
Findus is associated with less machinery utilization. 
 
The high profitability of Findus peas observed in the gross margin calculations is not coherent 
with our telephone survey. First, the survey results suggest that the pea producers think that 
the value of producing sugar beets and rapeseed is higher than the value of growing peas 
whilst the value of growing malting barley is comparable to producing peas. This is not 
coherent with Table 6, in which the value of growing peas is higher than the value of growing 
rapeseed and malting barley. Second, the pea producers rank the economic value of producing 
peas as number three out of three alternatives. The main advantage is considered to be 
preceding crop benefits followed by convenience aspects such as positive time aspects. The 
survey result also indicates that the farmers are not satisfied with the financial compensation 
for growing peas. However, there are some issues that must be taken into account when 
considering the farmers’ expressed dissatisfaction with the economic compensation. The 
answers may be biased as the participants may state that they are unsatisfied in order to avoid 
a price decrease or to encourage a price increase. Table 6 shows that the income, note not the 
profit, per hectare of Findus peas is the lowest income per hectare compared to all other crops 
in the crop rotation. Farmers can easily calculate the received income per hectare for various 
crops whilst the actual gross margin per hectare for various crops is more vague and 
complicated to calculate.  
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The fact that the survey result differs to such an extent in relation to the QRP model result 
indicate that the pea producers underestimate the value of producing peas and/or overestimate 
the value of alternative crops. Hence, the substantially lower costs per hectare of Findus peas 
may not be considered when comparing the value of growing Findus peas with the value of 
producing alternative crops. This is also illustrated in Appendix 6. In the optimization model, 
it is assumed that no crops are stored at the farm. Thus, all output prices are based on prices at 
harvest, i.e. August to October. This may have affected the case farm’s average income and 
thus gross margin for winter wheat, rapeseed and malting barley in a negative way as prices 
tend to be lower at harvest compared to prices at other points in time. Moreover, possible 
costs of soil compaction should be considered as about 11% of the respondents in the survey 
state that the risk of soil compaction at harvest is a major drawback of pea production for 
Findus. The possible cost of soil compaction is not considered when calculating the gross 
margin for Findus peas but should not be overlooked when comparing the gross margins of 
various crops. 
 
If peas cannot be grown, the case farm’s expected net farm income decreases with 151 559 
SEK compared to producing peas under the current contract, which is an 8% decrease of the 
total expected net farm income. Instead of producing peas for Findus, more winter wheat will 
be grown according to the optimal farm plan derived in the QRP model. The value of 
incorporating Findus peas in the crop rotation for the case farm under the current pricing 
model is 439 SEK per hectare. This number is calculated in terms of the total acreage of the 
farm, i.e. 345 hectares.  
 
6.4 Generalizability  
Can our results, which refer to the case farm used in our study, be generalized for Findus’ 
entire pea production area? In this section the generalizability of the case farm’s cost structure 
and the case farm’s optimal farm plan are evaluated. Also, it is discussed if there are any 
differences in the pea producers’ opinions of the value of growing peas depending on region. 
Lastly, the pea producers’ derived coefficient of absolute risk aversion is discussed.   
 
It would have been interesting to use more than one case farm as the generalizability for 
Findus entire production area would have been higher. However, if more case farms would 
have been included, the reliability of our study would have been reduced due to that data 
collected would not have been as detailed and extensive.  
 
The case farm’s high cj-value for Findus peas is somewhat surprising compared to the survey 
results. It is possible that the case farm tends to plant at a favorable time each year. If this 
happens to be the case, this affect the case farm’s average pea yield positively and thus the 
gross margin. The cost estimations for depreciation of machinery and maintenance are in the 
enterprise budget calculations based on the case farm’s actual crop rotation and the case 
farm’s amount of arable land. The survey result indicates that the Findus pea producers on 
average farm 280 hectares, which is somewhat lower than the case farm’s tillable acreage. 
This may suggest that the machinery costs are somewhat lower per hectare for the case farm 
than for the average pea producer as the machinery costs can be allocated on a larger 
production area i.e. more hectares. However, the case farm’s cost structure in terms of 
machinery costs is assumed to be average compared to medium sized farms in south western 
Skåne (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 2012). The case farm has joint ownership for several of the 
machines used in the sugar beet production and some other machinery including the fertilizer 
spreader.  
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To test whether the result of the optimization model is generalizable or not, a comparison with 
farms with roughly the same conditions as the case farm is conducted. Hence, the result can 
only be compared to farms with similar crop rotation. The case farm’s crop rotation is 
representative for the south western part of Skåne (pers. comn., Yngvesson, 2012; pers. 
comn., Nilsson, C, 2012). The south western part of Skåne is defined as yield survey districts 
1211, 1212, 1213, 1214 and 1216, see Appendix 4. Thus, our results have been compared to 
the above defined region. Consequently, our results cannot be generalized for Findus’ entire 
pea production area. By comparing the case farm’s optimal farm plan with an optimal farm 
plan based on data for the above stated survey districts, it can be concluded if the case farm’s 
results can be generalized for this area.  
 
Historical yield data for winter wheat, rapeseed, malting barley and sugar beets for yield 
survey districts 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214 and 1216 were collected for the years 2002-2011. 
Thereafter, average yields per crop and year for all districts were compiled. Historical data for 
Findus peas was obtained from Findus. The data included payment per hectare of Findus peas 
and zip codes for all Findus pea producers during the time period 2007-2011. Payment per 
hectare was considered to be a superior measure compared to yield per hectare as variety and 
t-value differs between producers and years. By translating the zip codes into SCB’s yield 
survey districts, selection of pea producers in the right area was enabled. Thereafter, an 
overall annual average payment per hectare for the districts 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214 and 1216 
was calculated. Instead of the case farm’s yield data, the collected SCB yield data and Findus 
data were applied in the QRP model. The same output prices for winter wheat, malting barley, 
rapeseed and sugar beets were used, see section 4.2.3 Gross Margin Calculations. By adding 
the annual EU subsidy to the annual average payment per hectare of Findus peas, the annual 
income per hectare of Findus peas was obtained. The same costs as those used when deriving 
the case farm’s optimal farm plan were used.  
 
Table 11 illustrates the average gross margins, i.e. cj-values, used in the generalized QRP 
model. When comparing the case farm’s average gross margins with the average gross 
margins of the south western part of Skåne, it is clear that the cj-values for south western 
Skåne are substantially lower than the case farm’s cj-values. In spite of this, the results of the 
generalized optimization model show that the optimal farm plan is exactly the same as the 
case farm’s optimal farm plan. Table 11 shows that the most profitable crop in the crop 
rotation is sugar beets followed by Findus peas, which is coherent with the case farm’s 
average gross margins shown in Table 6. Hence, as the case farm, the pea producers in the 
south western part of Skåne receive a payment from Findus that on average exceeds their 
reservation value. Accordingly, the results of this study are generalizable for the south 
western part of Skåne. However, the difference between the average gross margin for Findus 
peas in south western Skåne and the average gross margins for alternative crops is 
substantially lower than for the case farm. If Findus peas is excluded from the crop rotation in 
the generalized QRP model, the total expected net farm income decreases with about 91 000 
SEK which is a 7% reduction and corresponds to a loss in expected net farm income of 264 
SEK per hectare.  
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To examine whether there are any differences in the pea producers’ opinions of the value of 
growing peas depending on region, chi-square tests on some of the survey result were 
conducted (Wahlin, 2011). The survey statements included in the chi-square tests were 16-19 
and 20, see Appendix 2. The respondents were divided into two groups; producers situated in 
the south western part of Skåne, in accordance with the above stated definition, were sorted 
into one group and the remaining producers into another group. The procedure of the chi-
square tests is described in Appendix 7. The chi-square tests show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the answer distribution of questions 16, 17, 19 and 20. Hence, 
the producers in the south western part of Skåne tend to value peas in relation to winter wheat, 
rapeseed and sugar beets somewhat lower than producers in the remaining Findus pea 
production area. There is no statistically significant difference between the groups regarding 
their perception of the value of growing malting barley in relation to Findus peas. Moreover, 
according to the chi-square test of statement 20, producers in south western Skåne are slightly 
less satisfied with the financial compensation they receive for growing peas than other 
producers. Consequently, the pea producers not situated in the south western part of Skåne, 
perceive that the gross margin for Findus peas to a greater extent is comparable to the gross 
margin of alternative crops.  
 
The optimal solution for each pricing model is the farm plan with the maximum expected net 
farm income. This holds despite the fact that the Findus pea producers are considered to be 
relatively risk averse. In accordance with the survey results and classification made by 
Hardaker et. al., (1997) the pea producers’ coefficient of relative risk aversion (rr(w)) is 
estimated to 2.0. The result of the QRP model indicates that the case farm’s optimal farm plan 
only changes at a relative risk aversion substantially higher than 4.0. According to theory, a 
relative risk aversion of 4.0 denotes an extremely risk averse individual (Hardaker et. al., 
1997). Consequently, our optimal farm plan holds for all plausible degrees of risk aversion. 
The Findus pea producers’ absolute coefficient of risk aversion is derived by Equation 8. It is 
also possible to derive ra by the use of Equation 7. The case farm’s expected net farm income 
equals 20% of a wealth measure, w. The wealth measure refers to Swedish grain farmers 
estimated equity, i.e. assets reduced by debt. The equity estimation is based on SCB’s report 
“The 2010 Farm Economic Survey” (Statistiska centralbyrån, 2010). However, the optimal 
farm plan would have been the same even if Equation 7 would have been used. The only 
difference would have been that the tangents to each efficient frontier would have had a less 
steep slope, i.e. the pea producers would have been less risk averse.  
 
Table 11. Average gross margins per hectare (SEK), GM3, for the yield survey districts 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214 and 1216, 
i.e. south western parts of Skåne and for the case farm. All numbers in 2011 year’s price level. Moreover, the percentage 
decrease in gross margins between the case farm and the south western part of Skåne is presented.  
 WWpeas WWrape WWmb WWww RAPEmb RAPEpeas MB SB PEAS 
SW Skåne 3027 2985 1909 1506 1997 1231 2980 8190 3591 
Case farm 3680 3638 2562 2159 3737 2971 3656 11076 6584 
% Difference -18% -18% -25% -30% -47% -59% -18% -26% -45% 
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7 Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to examine, from the producer’s viewpoint, the current production 
contract between Findus and the pea producers and whether there are alternative pea pricing 
models that are more effective, for both contract parties, given volatile agricultural 
commodity markets. 
 
The current pricing model functions well based on theory, the result of the QRP model and 
the survey. The pea producers have incentives to maximize the integrated profit and Findus 
bears a relatively large share of the risk as the processor bears the price risk and a share of the 
general production risk. Nevertheless, it might be preferable to shift more of the general 
production risk to the cheaper risk bearer Findus through a window pricing model. The 
alternative pricing models formulated in this study have a rather limited effect on the Findus 
pea producers’ risk and return. However, the models were formulated so that the producers’ 
average pea price under the alternative pricing models is equal to the average price under the 
current pricing model.      
 
The alternative pricing models are not proven to increase the pea producers’ expected utility. 
The models can therefore, according to the QRP results for the case farm, not be regarded as 
more effective on volatile agricultural commodity markets than the current pricing model. 
The window pricing models are not preferred by the case farm as this would reduce the case 
farm’s average payment per hectare. However, a window pricing model may be preferable for 
pea producers with a lower average payment per hectare. The formulation of the window 
pricing models, especially the design of the price windows must be more carefully examined 
by someone with full access to Findus historical yield and payment data.       
 
According to our analysis, the value of incorporating Findus peas in the crop rotation is 
considered to be high. The performed gross margin calculations for the case farm and south 
western Skåne, reveal that the average gross margin of Findus peas is the second most 
profitable crop in the crop rotation. In addition, there are other values of growing peas such as 
preceding crop benefits and less working capital employed. This result is not entirely 
consistent with the result of the survey, which indicates that the gross margin for Findus peas 
are lower than the gross margins for rapeseed and malting barley. The estimated cost structure 
of the case farm has been verified by agricultural professionals and is considered to be 
generalizable for the south western part of Skåne. The pea production cost per hectare is 
considerably lower than the production costs for alternative crops. This implies that the gross 
margin for Findus peas is high despite the fact that the income per hectare is lower than for 
other crops in the crop rotation. Accordingly, the pea producers participating in the survey are 
considered to either underestimate the value of producing peas and/or overestimate the value 
of alternative crops. 
 
7.1 Further Research 
There are a number of areas that would be interesting to further examine. It would be 
interesting to study how the variety, planting time, geographical area and the farmers’ skills 
affect the pea producers’ risk and return. Moreover, it would be ideal to have access to 
historical yields and payment data for all Findus pea producers over a number of years.   
 
If Findus and the Pea Grower Association decide to introduce a new pricing model in the 
production contract, further development and analysis of the alternative pricing models 
examined in this study are necessary. 
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Appendix 1: Variance-covariance Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WWpeas WWrape WWmb WWww RAPEmb RAPEpeas MB SB Current Deferred Window 1 Window 2 
WWpeas 5788458 5900559 5363518 5162128 4475699 3817041 4611504 -215658 -1354440 1497604 -2534005 -777855 
WWrape 5900559 6015363 5466811 5261104 4543322 3869104 4704712 -241811 -1409787 1508841 -2594002 -812196 
WWmb 5363518 5466811 4980045 4797508 4146496 3544991 4199028 -118567 -1271811 1360846 -2364502 -721903 
WWww 5162128 5261104 4797508 4623660 3997686 3423449 4009397 -72350 -1220070 1305349 -2278439 -688043 
RAPEmb 4475699 4543322 4146496 3997686 6570854 6094366 1707456 228492 -326551 640363 -2451244 -324900 
RAPEpeas 3817041 3869104 3544991 3423449 6094366 5736861 1237447 646567 -135707 531329 -1920341 -199591 
MB 4611504 4704712 4199028 4009397 1707456 1237447 6545301 226088 -1039028 2352282 -459137 -692726 
SB -215658 -241811 -118567 -72350 228492 646567 226088 24593694 -5209180 -2742342 48812 -3192207 
Current -1829289 -1895124 -1701669 -162913 -658935 -379071 -1466931 -5209180 4198928    
Deferred 1497604 1508841 1360846 1305349 640363 531329 2352282 -2742342  2736643   
Window 1 -2534005 -2594002 -2364502 -2278439 -2451244 -1920341 -459137 48812   2808375  
Window 2 -777855 -812196 -721903 -688043 -324900 -199591 -692726 -3192207    2193427 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire, Telephone Survey 
 
1. How old are you? 
2. How many hectares do you farm? 
3. How many of these hectares are on average peas?  
4. For how many years have you grown peas for Findus during the past ten years? 
5. In your opinion, how is the production risk divided between the farmer and Findus? 
(percent) 
6. In your opinion, how is the price risk divided between the farmer and Findus? (percent) 
 
 
Next, a series of statements will be presented. Specify your level of agreement with the 
following statements on the scale:  
1: Strongly disagree, 2: Agrees to a small extent, 3: Neutral, 4: Degree to a high extent, 
5: Strongly agree. 
 
Part 1: Risk attitude 
 
Degree of market orientation 
7. I keep myself updated about the market prices of the products that I produce. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
8. I adapt to changes in the grain market. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Risk preference 
9. I consider the grain market as risky. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
10. I am able to predict grain spot prices. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Innovativeness 
11. I buy new products before my colleagues buy them. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
12. I like experimenting with new ways of doing things in my enterprise. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Risk attitude scale 
13. I am more concerned about making a large loss than to forgo a significant profit. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
14. I would rather be safe than sorry. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
15. I am willing to take higher financial risks when selling my grain, in order to realize higher 
average yields.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Part 2: Opinions about the current pea production contract 
 
The pea producers’ motivation for producing peas 
16. The economic value of producing peas in comparison to rapeseed is high. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
17. The economic value of producing peas in comparison to winter wheat is high. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
18. The economic value of producing peas in comparison to malting barley is high. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
19. The economic value of producing peas in comparison to sugar beets is high. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Opinion about the pricing model  
20. I am satisfied with the financial compensation I receive from Findus for producing peas. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
21. I think it is good that the pea price is specified when the contract is signed.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
22. I would prefer if the pea price follows grain prices to a greater extent.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
23. I am willing to take higher financial risks when producing peas, in order to realize a 
higher average payment.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
24. What are the benefits of producing peas? Rank the following options, start with the option 
that you believe is most advantageous. 
_______Preceding crop benefits and crop rotation 
_______Economically beneficial crop 
_______Easy crop to grow as it results in reduced work load, etc.  
 
25. Is there anything in the pea contract that you would like to change? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 3: Introduction Letter 
Can Findus’ pea production contract be improved with respect to the 
pricing model? 
You are one of 80 randomly selected pea producers who signed Findus pea production 
contract for the growing season 2012. We are two agribusiness students from the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences in Uppsala who are writing our master thesis in 
collaboration with Findus. We have received your contact information from Findus and you 
have been contacted since we are interested in your opinions regarding the pricing model 
currently used in the Findus pea production contract. 
The purpose of this study is to examine, from the perspective of the pea producers, whether 
there are alternative pricing models that would be perceived as an improvement to the 
current pea production contract. We are also interested in your perceptions about the risk of 
growing peas in relation to the compensation you receive. 
 We will contact you to confirm that you are interested in participating in a telephone 
interview. If you confirm that you are interested in participating, we will also schedule for an 
appointment for the interview. The interview is expected to take 10 minutes and will be 
conducted during week 13, 15, 16 and 17 (19/3 to 29/4). The interview mainly consists of a 
series of statements that you are asked to answer by selecting one of the following options: 
1) Strongly disagree, 2) Agrees to a small extent, 3) Neutral, 4) Degree to a high extent, 
5) Strongly agree 
 
Your answers will be treated confidentially. It will not be possible to connect your answers 
to you as a person and the results will be presented in a summarized report. Both Findus and 
The Pea Grower Association are interested in improving the contract and are therefore 
interested in your opinion. Your opinions are important and may affect the future pricing 
model of the contract. 
  
Thanks in advance for your participation! 
 
     
 
Frida Thorstensson 
070-739 90 47 
frth0001@stud.slu.se 
Åsa Andersson 
073-409 93 68 
asan0001@stud.slu.se 
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Appendix 4: SCB’s Yield Survey Districts, Skåne 
 
 
Source: Statistiska centralbyrån, 2011  
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Appendix 5: Overview Enterprise Budget Method 
 
Incomes and seperable costs per ha
Quantity Price SUM
INCOMES
Sales kg SEK SUM
EU subsidy no SEK SUM
SUM INCOMES SUM
SEPERABLE COSTS
Seed kg SEK SUM
Fertilizer nitrogen (N) kg SEK SUM
Fertilizer phosphor (P) kg SEK SUM
Fertilizer potass (K) h SEK SUM
Fuel, tractor h SEK SUM
Fuel, combine kg SEK SUM
Fuel, loader h SEK SUM
Herbicides no SEK SUM
Insecticides no SEK SUM
Fungicides no SEK SUM
Transport dt SEK SUM
Grain drying dt SEK SUM
Analysis of grain no SEK SUM
SUM SEPERABLE COSTS 1 SUM
Maintenance, machinery h SEK SUM
Working capital kr % SUM
SUM SEPERABLE COSTS 2 SUM
Real net user cost of capital and depreciation costs of assets h SEK SUM
Labor h SEK SUM
SUM SEPERABLE COSTS 3 SUM
GROSS MARGIN 
GM 1 = INCOMES - SEPERABLE COSTS 1 SUM
GM 2 = INCOMES - SEPERABLE COSTS 2 SUM
GM 3 = INCOMES - SEPARABLE COSTS 3 SUM
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Appendix 6: Enterprise Budgets for Findus Peas 
and Winter Wheat Preceded by Rapeseed, 2011  
  
FINDUS PEAS WINTER WHEAT 
INCOMES GROWN AFTER RAPESEED
Quantity Price SUM Quantity Price SUM
Sales kg 6 905 1,28 8 831 7 968 1,66 13 231
EU subsidy SEK 1,0 2 291,00 2 291 1,0 2 291,00 2 291
SUM INCOMES 11 122 15 522
SEPERABLE COSTS
Quantity Price SUM Quantity Price SUM
Seed kg 0 0,00 0 180 3,63 653
Fertilizer nitrogen (N) kg 0 0,00 0 173 10,33 1 787
Fertilizer phosphor (P) kg 24 6,01 145 24 27,50 660
Fertilizer potass (K) kg 7,5 48,10 360 7,5 38,00 285
Fuel, tractor h 3,0 150,00 450 3,5 150,00 525
Fuel, combine h 0,0 0,00 0 0,4 256,00 102
Fuel, loader h 0,2 124,00 25 0,5 124 62
Herbicides no 1,0 485,00 485 2,0 222,50 445
Insecticides no 1,0 220,00 220 0,5 64,00 32
Fungicides no 0,0 0,00 0 2,0 245,00 490
Transport dt 0 0,00 0 96 4,40 422
Grain drying dt 0 0,00 0 96,00 9,50 912
Analysis of grain no 0,00 0,00 0 0 195,00 53
SUM SEPERABLE COSTS 1 1 685 6 428
Maintenance, machinery h 1,0 419,00 419 1,0 54,00 988
Working capital SEK 981 7% 69 3 386 0,07 237
SUM SEPERABLE COSTS 2 2 173 7 653
Real net user cost of capital and depreciation costs of assets SEK 1 449,00 1 449 3 773,00 2 264
Labor h 3,2 225,00 720 4 225,00 990
SUM SEPERABLE COSTS 3 4 342 10 907
GROSS MARGIN
GM1 = INCOMES-SEPERABLE COSTS 1 9 437 9 094
GM2 = INCOMES-SEPERABLE COSTS 2 8 949 7 869
GM3 = INCOMES-SEPERABLE COSTS 3 6 780 4 615
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Appendix 7: Chi-square (X2) Test 
This appendix exemplifies the chi-square calculations for statement 9. Calculations for 
statement 10, 11, 12 and 20 are performed in the same way. A contingency table is produced 
by cross tabulation from the multivariable frequency distribution of statement 9, see Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Contingency table of statement 9. 
Answer 
distribution 
South western 
Skåne 
Remaining 
production area 
Row 
total 
1 11 2 13 
2 11 6 17 
3 9 13 22 
4 2 8 10 
5 1 0 1 
Column total 34 29 63 
 
The first step is to formulate two hypotheses, H0 and H1 (Wahlin, 2011): 
 
H0: There are no differences in the distribution between groups.   
H1: There are differences in the distribution between groups.   
 
The hypotheses are tested by the test variable formulated as (Wahlin, 2011): 
𝑥2 = ∑ (𝑂𝑖−𝐸𝑖)2
𝐸𝑖
𝑊
𝑖=1  (14) 
W = Number of cells in the contingency table 
Oi = Observed frequency, read out from the contingency table 
Ei= Expected frequency 
 
If there are no differences between the groups, i.e. the null hypothesis is true, the expected 
frequency should be the same between the groups (Wahlin, 2011). In the second step, the 
observed frequencies between the two groups are compared with the expected frequencies if 
the null hypothesis is true. The expected frequencies can be defined as: 
 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑅𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙∗𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (15) 
 
Table 13. Expected frequencies of statement 9. 
Answer 
distribution 
South western 
Skåne 
Remaining 
production area 
Row 
total 
1 13*34/63 13*29/63 13 
2 17*34/63 17*29/63 17 
3 22*34/63 22*29/63 22 
4 10*34/63 10*29/63 10 
5 1*34/63 1*29/63 1 
Column total 34 29 63 
 
The third step is to subtract the observed frequencies from the expected frequencies, shown in 
Table 13, square the difference and then divide by the expected frequency (Wahlin, 2011). 
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Thereafter the values from each cell are summed. The procedure follows Equation 14 as 
shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Chi-Square values for statement 9. 
Answer 
distribution 
South western 
Skåne 
Remaining 
production area 
Row 
total 
1 (11-7.02)2/7.02 (2-5.98)2/5.98 13 
2 (11-9.17)2/9.17 (6-7.83)2/7.83 17 
3 (9-11.87)2/11.87 (13-10.13)2/10.13 22 
4 (2-5.40)2/5.40 (8-4.60)2/4.60 10 
5 (1-0.54)2/0.54 (0-0.46)2/0.46 1 
Column total 34 29 63 
 
The chi-square values in Table 14 are compared with a critical value obtained from the chi-
square table (Wahlin, 2011). In this study, a significance level of 5% is chosen and the degree 
of freedom is equal to 4. In order for the null hypothesis to be rejected the calculated chi-
square value must be equal to or larger than the critical value.  
 
